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I. INTRODUCTION 
CONTRACT law enforces assent-based contracts because they im-prove welfare for both the parties and for society.1 In a world without transaction costs or frictions, parties can achieve optimal 
outcomes on their own.2 
* John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. Sincere thanks are due to Miranda Bureau, Brian Carney, Randeep Dhiman, Jeff 
Dornbos and Michael Halper who provided valuable research assistance. Professors Omri 
Ben-Shahar, Dick Craswell, Peter M. Gerhart, and Ronald J. Coffey provided valuable 
comments. Thanks are also due to Dean Gary Simson and to the Case Western Reserve 
Law School which provided research funds. The paper also benefited from presentation at 
the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, held May 16-17, 2008. 
Final and heartfelt thanks are due to Eleanore Ettinger, whose technical assistance, en-
couragement, and supreme attention to detail made a significant contribution to this and 
all my other articles. 
1. This assumes no externalities. 
2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15 (1960). 
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In the real world, however, many frictions and impediments interfere 
with the parties achieving optimal outcomes. Uncertainties of various 
types impede parties as each decides whether to enter into a contract with 
another party.3 Parties lack knowledge about their counterparty, specifi-
cally about their characteristics and qualities, including their propensity 
to act opportunistically.4 That uncertainty makes it difficult to achieve a 
contract that expressly controls all of the possible permutations of the 
risk of moral hazard. s 
The problem of uncertainty is pervasive in all contract negotiations. 
Parties do not know what the probability of reaching an agreement is and 
if so, whether it is worth expending costs to find out and up to what 
point.6 Each potential party to a contract has a sense that the contract 
will improve his welfare (and the welfare of society), and each is there-
fore optimistic about the possibility of a bargain. But that optimism is 
tempered by three factors. First, each party knows that it cannot produce 
joint gains from trade if it gives up too much.? The party is therefore 
uncertain about whether the other side will be asking too much to enter 
into the deal. Second, each party knows that the success of the collabora-
tion depends on a variety of factors that require predictions as to the 
future states of the world, including market conditions (or, more broadly, 
conditions beyond the control of either party) and the decisions and ac-
tions of the other party.8 In general, uncertainty applies to one's own 
ability to perform, the other party's ability to perform, and states of the 
world that are unrelated to either party's ability to perform. Third, each 
3. T11e decision to enter into a fully contingent contract is the ultimate decision, but 
the parties could enter a number of preliminary agreements, including letters of intent and 
agreements to agree. The legal treatment of these interim agreements will depend on a 
number of factors. See infra text accompanying notes 161-169; see also E. Allan Farns-
worth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Nego-
tiations, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 217, 221-243 (1987) (discussing different bases for liability in 
precontractual negotiations including unjust enrichment, specific promise, misrepresenta-
tion, and general obligation). 
4. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47-49 (1985). For a recent treatment of the impor-
tant role that the problem of curbing opportunism plays in interpretation, see generally 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning v. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism 
Defeats a Unitary Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2007) (discussing opportunism 
and contract interpretation). 
5. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 48. For example, a principal hiring an agent 
lacks fundamental knowledge about the agent's "propensity to diverge" and is uncertain 
about the precise ways in which such "propensity" will manifest itself. Email from Ronald 
J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet 
Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Jan. 27, 
2005) (on file with author). This uncertainty poses a contracting problem for the principal 
who cannot draft a complete contract to control for unknowable choices and predilections. 
6. As Professors Hermalin, Katz and Craswe\1 explain, "[i]n order to conduct ex-
change, the parties must not only find each other, but they must also determine whether 
trade is worthwhile." Benjamin Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract 
Law, in HANDBOOK oF LAW AND EcoNOMICS 3, 59 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shave\1 
eds., 2007). The search is to ascertain whether gains from trade exist. 
7. See id. 
8. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 57. 
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party is uncertain about its counterparty's particular proclivity to engage 
in opportunistic behavior but knows that there is some potential for such 
opportunistic behavior in the general population, as it is a facet of human 
nature. 9 The presence of certain structural factors affecting the sequence 
of investment may increase the potential for opportunistic behavior. 10 
TI1e optimism of potential opportunities from joint gains from trade is 
therefore tempered by the risk that a party will invest in reducing the 
uncertainty only to find out that a bargain is not feasible, or that a bar-
gain that looked good (profitable) turns out to be bad (unprofitable), or 
that he has made himself worse off by providing the other party with 
information that the other party can use opportunistically. 11 The law 
grapples with this latter risk in precontractual negotiation cases12 and, in 
ways that will be explored later, the risk also exists in the reliance on 
preliminary agreements where parties agree on a sequence of investment. 
Some of these uncertainties, particularly those relating to the future, 
may be resolved by negotiating with another party over time, since time 
itself may resolve some issues_13 Parties also can reduce uncertainty by 
undertaking search costs and making expenditures to acquire 
information. 14 
Parties can also use the ''courtship process" and proceed incrementally 
to mitigate and resolve some of these uncertainties before they commit to 
one another. 15 Negotiating has costs, and parties will weigh the costs of 
negotiating against the benefits to be derived from a deal that may or 
may not be reached. 16 During this initial period of uncertainty before a 
contract is formed, each party must decide whether and when to make 
9. The inability to know !he exact degree to which a given party will act opportunisti-
cally makes it important to "expend( J resources to discriminate among types" in order to 
achieve gains. Jd. at 48. Williamson observes that this variance among types means that 
··problems of economic organization are compounded if the propensity to behave oppor-
tunistically is known to vary among members of the contracting population .... " Jd. 
l 0. See id. at 58. 
11. See Hermalin et al.. supra note 6, at 59-61. An investment in general market infor-
mation may show that one bargain will not produce gains from trade but that a bargain 
with a different partner would, so the investment in that information is not lost when the 
first potential bargain is abandoned. T11at. of course, means that the incentive to produce 
that kind of market information will not be decreased or threatened by the possibility that 
a particular potential bargain will not work out. 
12. ld. at 61. 
13. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Es-
toppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249. 1269 (1996) (discussing optimal 
Lime to invest bnsed on progressive reduction of uncertainty concerning certain variables 
over time). 
14. See Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Prob-
lem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 403-04 (1988). 
15. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and 
the Lmv of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REv. 385, 388 (1999). Johnston explains that 
"courtsh~p" is a "process by which markets for complex and highly differentiated goods 
and services are created." Jd. at 388. 
. 1_6. !d. at 388-89. The possibility of reaching a deal will be the subject of a probability 
dJstn~ution. This same basic analysis of optimal negotiating costs applies to all sorts of 
costs mcurrecl. including search costs for possible contracting partners. "From the perspec-
tive of a social·planner, one would want the parties to undertake such efforts up to the 
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investments of various kinds. If a deal is never reached, these invest-
ments may be lost forever. If a deal is reached, when and if each of the 
parties has invested will determine how much of the surplus is available 
for them to split.l 7 In turn, that prospect will affect their incentives to 
invest in future negotiations and contracts. 
Traditionally, under ~he aleato_ry vie_w,18 the law took a "knife-edge" 
approach to compensatmg for reliance mvestment that was most likely to 
occur during this period of uncertainty. 19 That conventional approach 
denied any compensation for reliance without a contract but granted full 
enforcement to assent-based explicitly reciprocal contracts with consider-
ation.20 Absent such a contract, any reliance investment was deemed 
non-compensableY Parties relied at their own peril in the absence of a 
bargained-for contract.22 
Following the adoption of Section 90 of the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts,23 courts adopted a more liberal approach to reliance comper;sation 
issues. They sometimes found liability when a promisee relied on the 
promises of a putative offeror despite the absence of a bargain in pre-
contractual negotiations without the benefit of any bargained-for agree-
ment.24 Hoffman v. Red Owl25 is the paradigm case permitting such re-
covery. Recently, courts have also begun to uphold reliance claims in 
cases where parties reached a preliminary agreement together with an 
agreement to invest simultaneously, one party had invested after the pre-
liminary agreement was reached, and the other party walked away from 
the deal and refused to agree to a final contract.26 
Recently, two scholars, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, have cast 
doubt on the liberal theory of reliance recovery.27 They argue that courts 
generally deny recovery for reliance in cases involving precontractual 
preliminary negotiation28 but grant recovery in cases involving reliance 
point where the marginal costs of additional search just outweigh its expected marginal 
value." Hermalin et a!.. supra note 6, at 53. 
17. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuclc & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliauce. 30 1. 
LEG. STUD. 423, 424 (2001). The contract itself "will stipulate how to divide the surplus 
that will be generated in part by the reliance investments." ld. . 
18. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221. Under this view, investments made to Wlll an 
ultimate contract are done at one's peril. See infra Section III. 
19. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontracwal Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments. 120 HARV. L. REv. 661, 675 (2007). 
20. Farnsworth, supra note 3. at 221-23. T11e contract price and expectancy dama~es 
automatically compensate a party for his reliance expenditures since the contract pnce 
includes an amount sufficient to cover one's reliance investment in the contract and Ill-
eludes a profit that exceeded the reliance investment. ld. at 223. 
21. ld. at 221. 
22. ld. 
23. RESTATErviENT (FIRST) oF CoNTRACTs§ 90 (1932). 
24. See Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 236-37. 
25. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Inc .. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). . 
26. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19. at 662-65 (discussing the advent of such claims 
under preliminary agreements and explaining the basis for success). 
27. fd. at 663-65. 
28. !d. at 673. Schwartz and Scott explain the lack of success in such preliminary nego-
tiation cases as follows: "The courts' reluctance to award damages in these cases may rest 
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following a preliminary agreement. In this latter class of cases there is an 
"emerging legal rule" that makes the promisor who breaches an obliga-
tion of good faith "liable for the promisee's reliance expenditures. "29 
They identify a pattern in which success is likely and then provide an 
analytical framework to justify liability. When parties reach a prelimi-
nary agreement that also includes an agreement that they both invest si-
multaneous!y30-what I will refer to as agreements to jointly investigate 
or explore-and one party strategically delays investment for personal 
gain, the law permits the investing party to recover for reliance expendi-
tures when the other party walks away from the deaJ.31 Courts find the 
party who exits the deal to be guilty of a breach of the good faith obliga-
tion that governs parties' actions in preliminary agreements.32 
Based on an extensive review of case law, this Article suggests that, 
contrary to the Schwartz and Scott thesis, courts do grant recovery for 
reliance expenditures made in precontractual preliminary negotiations 
even when the parties have not reached "an agreement."33 TI1e courts' 
willingness to do so depends on a pattern in which the promisor solicits 
reliance expenditures to reduce uncertainty or to hedge his bets pending 
the resolution of uncertainty and the promisee relies, particularly if the 
reliance investment takes the form of a cooperative investment rather 
than a selfish investment.34 Neither the promisor nor the promisee would 
want the promisor to have what amounts to an option that he does not 
pay for if it would disincentivize promisees from investing and/or discour-
age trades. 
The risk of holdup is present whenever there is sequential investment. 
Once one party invests a sunk cost, one of two possibilities exist: either 
the deal never materializes, in which case the sunk cost is lost, or the deal 
materializes but the non-investing party shares in the surplus.35 TI1at 
need to share part of the surplus renders the investing party vulnerable to 
holdup and discourages promisees from investing.36 Tims, this Article 
~uggests that courts are willing to grant recovery for reliance expenditures 
m both categories of cases: (1) precontractual negotiations with no agree-
partly on the pa:ties' ability to protect early reliance themselves by using alternative con-
tractual mechamsms. The cases thus raise the question why parties sometimes fail to use 
these ?Ptions." !d. at 693. My results are contrary and point to success in these cases 
assummg t~e presence of a promise, a transaction-specific investment, detriment, and rea-
5?nable reha~ce. ~ee id. at 664-65. TI1ese results may be explained in part by the difficul-
~~~~-~~~t parties might have in drafting contractual protective mechanisms. See infra notes 
29. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664-65. 
30. As Schwartz and Scott point out "neither the transaction nor what the parties are to d . . ' 
3° IS preCISely de~cribe_d, a~d neither may be written down." !d. at 663. 
321. ld. at 685 (d1scussmg circumstances that will cause the party to delay investment). 
· ld. at 694. · 
33. See infra Section VI. 
Co 34· See Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of on~~]r~~ttngci· 89 AM. EcoN. REv. 125, 125 (1999) (defining '"cooperative· investments [as 
35 at Irectly benefit the investor's partner"). 
36· Bldebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17. at 423-24. 
· . at 431-32. 
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ment and (2) reliance that follows a binding preliminary agreement. In 
each set of cases, their willingness to do so is predicated on a framework 
in which courts seek to control the problem of opportunistic behavior.37 
Presumably, both parties would want such control because the uncon-
trolled risk of such behavior would discourage future transactions. 38 That 
framework connects the results of successful preliminary reliance negoti-
ation cases (the Hoffman v. Red Owf39 type case) and the successful cases 
of recovery for reliance on preliminary agreements with an agreement to 
jointly invest, identified recently by Schwartz and Scott.'+D Whether a 
court is deciding if the good faith obligation requires compensation for 
reliance made pursuant to a preliminary agreement for joint investment 
or if a liability rule for reliance in precontractual negotiations is war-
ranted, the court is concerned with essentially the same problem of regu-
lating the holdup problem. 
Schwartz and Scott endorse enforcement of preliminary agreements 
with concomitant agreements to jointly investigate or explore only where 
the joint promise to investigate is relatively explicit.41 By contrast, this 
Article advocates a legal default rule42 that would grant compensation 
where the promise to investigate jointly is only implicit. An implicit 
agreement is found where one party would not have invested unless there 
had been an understanding that the investing party would be compen-
sated if the other party operated opportunistically with respect to that 
37. As Oliver Hart explains, "[w]e are all looking for a contract that will ensure that, 
whatever happens, each side has some protection, both against opportunistic behaviour by 
the other party and against bad luck." OuvER HART, FIRMS, CoNTRACTS AND FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 2 (1996). 
The cases that I identify to illustrate successful claims to prevent opportunistic conduct 
do not necessarily involve cases in which the defendant has actually acted to hold up the 
plaintiff following a sunk cost investment. In some instances the defendant exits the rela-
tionship without actually attempting to hold up the plaintiff. However, the potential for 
opportunism is there in either case. If the defendant goes on to consummate the deal, he 
can hold up the plaintiff through demands for part of the surplus. If the defendant exits 
the relationship, the investment is wholly lost. It is the potential for opportunistic hold up 
that the court must be concerned with because that prospect will act as a drag on gains 
from trade in future transactions. I am grateful to Dick Craswell for raising this issue of 
the presence of actual attempts at hold up. Email from Richard CraswelL Professor of 
Law. Stanford University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky. Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2008, 16:07 CST). 
38. ld. 
39. See generally Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (grant-
ing recovery for reliance investments made during preliminary negotiations). 
40. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 694. Thus, contrary to Schwartz and Scott, 
who posit that "[l]egal scholars and practicing lawyers have poorly understood these types 
of cases" because they have considered them all together, this Article argues that it may be 
useful to consider these cases together if the problems of holdup and sequential investment 
are used to provide a unifying rationale. ld. at 663. 
41. ld. at690-9l. 
42. Richard Craswell provided valuable insight into the default rule approach of this 
Article. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promis-
ing. 88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 515 (1989) (explaining that "any default rule would also be 
consistent with individual freedom, as long JS the parties are allowed to change the 
rule .... "). 
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investment or had the ability to hold up the other party based on the 
sequence of investment. . . . . 
This Article will provide gmdance for courts cons1dermg whether, 
when. and why reliance investments made during precontractual negotia-
tions should be compensated through a default rule:+3 Where one party 
solicits investments to reduce uncertainty or to hedge the future, and the 
soliciting party is aware that the other party is relying by undertaking 
such investment. the reliance should be compensated to prevent both the 
holdup problem and the consequent under-reliance44 that occurs when 
one party solicits investments and then defers any action or contracting 
until the investments are made by the first party.45 
Paving greater attention to how courts take account of the potential for 
strat~gjc~ behavior. holdup, and the problem of under-reliance in deciding 
wheth~r. when, and why to award reliance costs would provide greater 
certainty to the area of precontractual reliance case law and give a more 
complete picture of when courts will and should find liability. Precise 
delineation of the stages of negotiation and agreement and the degree of 
vulnerability to hold up by the other party may vary, depending on the 
stage in which the investment is made and on whether the other party is 
investing simultaneously or has the discretion to defer until later on. 
These issues are important in resolving whether and when reliance costs 
should be reimbursed. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II looks at the overall problem of 
uncertainty in contracting and its effects on hindering complete contracts, 
the effect on parties' incentives to invest in the precontractual period 
given the holdup problem, and the methods for mitigating uncertainty, 
including the solicitation of reliance investments that can facilitate oppor-
tunism. P<wt IIJ examines the aleatory view of contracting, which denied 
all recovery for reliance investments if no bargain contract were 
achievecJ.-16 and reexamines whether the traditional view makes sense in 
situations of sequential investment. Part IV details the problem of 
holdup that occurs when one party invests and is subject to the other 
party appropriating part of the surplus in such a way that the investing 
party cannot gain the full benefit of its investment and so engages in 
suboptimal investment_-17 Part IV also examines cases in which sequential 
43 .. P.rofessor Omri Ben-Shahar would also provide guidance to courts, but he would 
use a d!lferent approach: not a default rule, but a liability rule with the advantage that it 
w:~uld obvJate the need for lin~ drawing. Omri B~n-Shahar. Contracts With~ut Consent, 
b_ U. PENN. L Rev. 1829, 18_,4 (2004). Under lm approach. "[w]hen partJes reach an 
agreement _In prmciple over some fundamental terms but plan to further negotiate. each 
~arty acqlllres the option to bind the other to a deal that includes the terms agreed upon, 
~ppl~~lented by proposals made by the other party and terms most favorable to that 
~rt'· !d. ll1IS A:ticle. instea? .. offers a w_ay c;>f determining ~iability based on a number 
actm s. Which wdl make hab1hty determmatiOns more predictable. 4~. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar. supra note 17, at 431-32. 
4.:>. SeeJohnston, supra note 15, at 495 (highlighting the awareness of the investment 
as a !actor In Imposing liability). 16. Farnsworth. supra note 3. at 221. 
7. Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 432. 
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investment may be a cure to strategic behavior. It discusses instances in 
which the sequential investment may require a legal response to curb a 
moral hazard problem and encourage investment, at least whether there 
are reasons to think that the parties would have agreed on such a liability 
rule were it not for a variety of obstacles to its express adoption by the 
parties, and where there are reasons to think that requiring parties to 
expressly adopt a liability rule in each case would be more costly or less 
effective than the alternative default rule of requiring parties to expressly 
opt into a liability rule. Part V links the two separate contexts in which 
reliance may occur: (1) following a preliminary agreement with an agree-
ment to invest simultaneously; and (2) during early preliminary precon-
tractual negotiations.48 Part V suggests that the two contexts can be 
linked since there is a risk of opportunism in each setting. It suggests that 
the analytical framework embraced by Professors Alaa Schwartz and 
Robert Scott49 should be extended to cover precontractual negotiation 
where the risk of holdup is also great. Part VI reexamines recent reliance 
case law to see if case outcomes are consistent with a rule imposing liabil-
ity when the risk of holdup is great. The support for such liability refutes 
the thesis of Schwartz and Scott that the case law rejects recovery on 
reliance unless an agreement is reached.50 This Article finds courts will-
ing to find liability even when there is too much uncertainty for an agree-
ment to exist if the defendant has solicited sunk costs to hedge while 
uncertainty is resolved. 
The real question is whether on a comparative cost basis it is a priori 
irrational to think that sometimes bargaining is relatively more wasteful 
than law-supplied terms.51 If so, then a law-supplied liability default rule 
presumption makes sense in certain sets of cases. 
II. UNCERTAINTY IN CONTRACTING 
In complex economies, transactions are delayed and not instantaneous; 
parties enter contracts but defer performance of one or both of them un-
til a future date. Uncertainty about many things, including the future, 
then complicates the bargaining process.52 Uncertainties about the past, 
including how one's counterparty has acted in prior transactions, may 
also hinder efficient bargaining. 53 Many types of uncertainty exist ex ante 
that affect how parties bargain: the timing of offers, the relative 
48. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 693-94. 
49. Id. at 690-91. 
50. Id. at 693. 
51. Email from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law, Case Western Law School, to 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Law School (May 19, 2008, 14:46 CST) 
(on file with author). 
52. See WILLIAMSON. supra note 4, at 30-32. 
53. See id. at 58. These uncertainties act as a form of a drag on trade. Parties struggle 
to reduce and mitigate the negative effects of uncertainty in various ways, but the costs of 
doing so constitute a type of transaction cost for parties. See Hermalin et al., supra note 6, 
at 60. 
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probability of a deal with a particular party,54 the incentive to dissemble 
or to be honest to one's counterparty,55 and the ability to reach a com-
plete contract.56 
These uncertainties affect the parties' incentive to invest in the pre-
contractual period given the holdup problem. The "ex ante holdup" 
problem"' is used to describe the negative effect on reliance investment 
that occurs when a party who invests "expects to be 'held up,' namely, he 
does not capture the full benefit of her [sic] reliance, but only a fraction 
of it. ... "58 
The types of uncertainty and how parties respond to such uncertainties 
in a variety of pre-contractual settings affect how the law should respond 
using a model of justificational analysis59 that intervenes only when doing 
so would improve the parties; welfare.60 In any transaction, parties ini-
tially do not even know whether there are gains to be made from a 
trad-e.fil The seller of an asset does not know the opportunity cost of 
selling its asset, and a buyer lacks knowledge of "what the opportunity 
would be worth to it. "62 For example, a company considering a merger 
faces substantial uncertainty of the first kind; it does not know ahead of 
time if the merger of the two companies will be successful, and so the 
bidder will not know what to pay for the target company ex ante."3 Par-
ties adopt different strategies to deal with the various types of uncertainty 
in transactions. They use a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to 
p!'oceed with negotiations,64 how much money to spend in reliance on the 
contract and at what point, how much pre-trade performance to engage 
in, and how much to expend to acquire information to reduce uncertain-
ties that exist about the future state of nature65 and the opportunistic 
proclivities of one's counterparty.66 
54. Johnston. supra note 15. at 389. 
55. See WILLIAMSON. supra note 4. at 58. 
. 5?. Pierpaolo Battigali & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, anrf the Costs of Writ-
mg C.omrncts. 92 AM. EcoN. REv. 798, 798 (2002). 
57. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 683 (explaining that "a party will not invest at 
all when he must share the expected gain with his partner. and as a consequence the party's 
portion of Ihe return will be below his cost"). 
58. Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 432. This is what Bebchuk and Ben-
Shahar refer to as the "Divergence Between Private and Social Gain." lrf. 
59. See inji·a note 210. 
. 60. To determine what approach will promote optimal welfare for the parties. this Ar-
ticle focuses on the effect of the rule prospectively on parties who are planning future 
transactions. In deciding whether judicial intervention would improve welfare, it will also 
explore private strategies that parties use to deal with the uncertainty problem in pre-
contractual negotiations, to determine if the Jaw can play any useful role in the pre-con-
tractual phase by facilitating investment that will help parties reach optimal contracts. 
61. Email from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
to Juhet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University (Sept. 27, 2007, 
10:28 CST) (on file with author). 
62. Johnston supra note 15, at 388. 
63. See irf. at 387-88. 
64. !d. at 389. 
65. Hermalin. et a!., supra note 6, at 59-60. 
66. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4. at 58. 
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When we speak of uncertainty and the effects that it will have on par-
ties negotiating toward a final contract, we must also delineate the vari-
ous types of uncertainty that exist, since parties may respond to them in 
different ways, and the nature of the uncertainty may hinder contracting 
and investment in different ways and affect whether and when judicial 
intervention might be needed. 
There is uncertainty about the state of nature, events both past and 
present. One cannot know what the future will bring no matter how 
much one expends in resources. There is also uncertainty about behavior. 
both past and present.67 One does not know how one's counterparty has 
acted in the past or how he is likely to act in the future. 6;,; One lacks 
information on that party's "propensity to diverge, "69 or what Oliver Wil-
liamson calls the problem of opportunism.7° 
If uncertainty did not exist, even in contracts that involve future per-
formance, the bargaining process would be simple, and parties could 
achieve fully contingent contracts that are self-enforcing. 71 Parties could 
draft complete contracts to take account of all relevant contingencies and 
events that would affect the payoff and could price those contracts to 
take account of different possible future events.72 Even uncertainty 
about the opportunistic tendencies of one's counterparty could be con-
trolled by detailed contracts that restricted the behavior of one ·s 
counterparty and mapped out all the possible choices that would come 
up. 73 
Uncertainty in the context of a contract continuing into the future com-
plicates contracting and makes it hard for the parties to achieve a com-
pletely contingent contract74 that deals with the full range of uncertainty. 
both about behavior and the future state of nature. 75 Uncertainty about 
67. /d. at 58. 
68. !d. 
69. Email from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University. to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law. Case Western Reserve University 
(Jan. 27. 2005) (on file with author). 
70. Parties who exchange goods simultaneously do not need to worry about what the 
future will hold (what economists call the state of nature) or how to build in protections in 
the contract to deal with future uncertain events. since the parties· obligations do nut c:x-
tend in the future. Even the uncertainty about whether one's counterparty is likely to act 
opportunistically in the future will be of no concern if performance is rendered simultane-
ously. Uncertainty about how one's counterparty has acted in the past and bow that 1111ght 
affect the terms or willingness to transact if one has to depend on the future performance 
of such person will be of no concern with instantaneous exchange. where one party docs 
not have to clepencl on the other. Because a party to an instantaneous transaction does not 
have to depend on the other party for continuing performance obligations. any uncertatnty 
about the counterparty is irrelevant. 
71. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 30-31. 
72. /d. 
73. See id. at 48. 
74. See e.g .. Battigali & Maggi. supra note 56. at 798; Jean Tirole. lncolllplete Con-
tracts: Where Do ll'e Stand?, 67 EcoNOMETRICA 741. 743 (1999). . 
75. Uncertainty about the choices that a party will have to make in the future makes H 
difficult for a principal to control the potential opportunistic behavior of an agent. a class1c 
example of how uncertainty renders complete contracting difficult to achieve. See Frank 
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a counterparty's past behavior may make it difficult to evaluate how risky 
8 partner- one is dealing with.76 This is the classic problem of adverse 
selection. 77 
Of course, if the investment could be deferred until the final contract, 
then the contract could protect those investments because the bargain 
and the price would more than cover reliance expenditures; it would in-
clude a profit as well. 
If pnrties do not invest any sunk costs (reliance) in a project until the 
uncertainty about events and retums is resolved, then the contract will 
protect the parties. Any sunk costs that are made after a contract is en-
tered into meet the assurance that if the other party defaults or breaches, 
the investing party will be protected by the expectation interest.78 If a 
party invests in the interim period before uncertainty is resolved and 
before 3 final contract is entered into. it may be taking the risk that the 
precontractual reliance cost will not be compensated.79 
When a party invests transaction-specific sunk costs, the situation be-
comes even more complicated.80 If no sunk costs exist, it does not matter 
if parties are unable to achieve a complete contract that addresses all 
possible problems because of the cognitive limits and the cost of acquir-
ing information (bounded rationality), and uncertainty. Parties may sim-
ply exit the relationship without any adverse consequences:" 1 The 
presence of sunk costs makes it costly to simply terminate.82 Moreover, 
the failure to control for future contingencies or behavior through a com-
plete contract may reduce the amount of joint surplus that parties could 
realize from the relationship.83 
Parties may proceed on their own with search costs to mitigate uncer-
tainty to determine whether gains from trade exist.84 When we talk about 
potential bargains, we are always talking about reciprocal uncertainty be-
cause each party is uncertain about the costs and benefits of a potential 
bargain.85 But because there is a possible bargain, each party also has a 
reason to reduce the other party's uncertainty, at least if that can be clone 
H. Esterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciarv Dutv, 36 J. LAw & EcoN. 425. 
427 (1993). . . 
76. WiLLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 58. An insurance company may be uncertain about 
an Jnsurecl'~ past risky behavior and that may make it difficult to price the insurance in a 
contract. 
77. Ser id. at 47. See generallv Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRIN-
,.ll'r\l.s AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNESS 37, 38 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser eels .. 1985) (defining two types of principal-agent problems: moral hazard and 
atlverse selection). 
78. See Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19. at 664. 
~9. E.g .. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.26 (4th eel. 2004). 
til.l. The mvestment of such costs contributes to what Williamson calls the "fundamen-
tal transformation·· in the relationship. WILUAMSON, supra note 4, at 61. 
8L Cf. id. at 62 (stating that party with sunk costs (transaction-specific) is "effectively 
comm1tted to the transaction ... "). 
82. !d. 
83. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar. supra note 17. at 423-24. 
84. See Craswell, supra note 14, at 401. 
85. See Johnston. supra note 15, at 388. 
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with investments that are justified by the potential gains in trade from an 
eventual bargain. A and B are each optimistic but uncertain, but because 
of their optimism, each has an incentive to invest something in reducing 
the other party's uncertainty in moving closer to a bargain. Each party 
will move closer when the investment in reducing the other party's uncer-
tainty is offset by the actual or potential benefit of that reduction (which 
could be in the form of future gains from trade). 
Some of these search costs may be significant and parties' willingness 
to undertake such costs "depends on whether they can be recouped''S6 in 
an ultimate contract. Such an expense by a buyer of securities of a partic-
ular company might include purchasing a Dun & Bradstreet report or 
perusing the company's financial statements. 
In other cases, if some of the uncertainties cannot be resolved before a 
commitment is given, the parties may also negotiate safeguards to protect 
themselves in the event that a matter whose outcome is uncertain ex ante 
is later resolved in a way that makes contractual performance disadvanta-
geous.87 A common example is the inclusion of an express condition that 
permits one party to exit the contract if a certain event that cannot be 
known ex ante materializes. 88 
Other uncertainties that cannot be resolved through search costs ex 
ante, such as the value of a company post-merger, may prompt parties to 
seek creative solutions to reach a contract ex ante that will postpone cer-
tain aspects of the deal, including pricing, until the uncertainty is re-
solved.89 Parties might implement structural solutions to provide 
incentives for the parties to work toward a successful outcome90 and 
make the price contingent on a successful merger. 91 
One major tool that each party has for negotiating in the face of uncer-
tainty is to solicit information from the other party92 that will reveal qual-
86. Hermalin et al., supra note 6, at 59. This would not be true if the parties could 
contract in advance on the amount to be invested and if the "party whose expected return 
is positive [could] guarantee his partner a nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse his 
partner for investment costs if the project is not pursued." Schwartz & Scott. supra note 
19, at 683 (detailing noncontractible investments interfering with contractual guarantees). 
Contracting difficulties may make this impossible. Incentives to invest would also con-
tinue, even if no reimbursement promise could be made, if the party invests in general 
market information that might show that one bargain would not produce gains from trade 
but another bargain would. In that case, the investment in the information is not lost when 
the first potential bargain is abandoned. 
87. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 60. 
88. FARNSWORTH, supra note 79, § 8.2 (detailing purpose "that conditionality presup-
poses some degree of risk arising out of uncertainty ... "). . 
89. Brian JM Quinn, Asset Specificity and Transaction Structures: A Case Swdy of 
@Home Corporation 2 Stan. L. & Econ., Olin, Working Paper No. 354 (2008). available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1099382. 
90. Janet Whitman, Company Finds Joint Ventures Ease Transitions, WALL ST. I.. July 
3, 2002, at BlO. . 
91. That solution can serve to mitigate the moral hazard problem that would otherwise 
exist. 
92. For a discussion of the relevance of reliance investment in resolving uncertainty 
problems, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, When Should Contract Law Supply a Liability R~tf~ a~· 
Term?: Framing a Principle of Unification for Contracts, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1283, bOb-b 
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ities valuable in helping the putative offer or decide whether to make an 
offer, and if so, on what terms. 93 Sometimes the information is relatively 
costless, both to give and receive.94 A party may signal its type by send-
ing out pessimisti~ statements if the chances of ~ deal are low and opti-
mistic statements rf the chances of a deal are hrgh.95 The advantage of 
sending a low-cost, accurate signal is that it weeds out recipients with 
whom the probability of a deal is low. The seller who sends a signal that 
he is high-cost can get information from the recipients about buyers' 
types merely by awaiting a response. Recipients will respond only to sell-
ers with whom there is a large probability of a trade occurring; low-value 
buyers will not respond to high-cost sellers and vice versa. 96 Because the 
sender of the message wants to deal only with the subgroup with whom a 
deal is probable or likely, the sender will send out accurate messages 
about his type in order to ensure that the class who responds actually has 
a high likelihood of proceeding towards a deal. The sender would not 
want to send inaccurate messages because doing so would prompt too 
many responses from recipients with incompatible qualities, thereby rais-
ing negotiating costs and lowering the probability of reaching a deal. 97 
At other times, one or both parties do not have enough information 
during preliminary negotiations to send cheap signals that take the form 
of a statement that the probability of reaching a deal is high or low be-
cause the probability of reaching a deal with the other party depends on a 
myriad of factors that are not yet known. 98 Tims, cheap signals that are 
(1) limited to information about one's own type; (2) designed to solicit 
information from the other party about the other party's type; and (3) 
costless to supply, may not really solve the bargaining problem posed 
when parties remain uncertain about the probabilities of trade and about 
the characteristics of the other party. To mitigate such uncertainty, a 
party can solicit information in the form of reliance investment that is 
transaction specific99 and therefore potentially costly because it will be 
(~000) (discussing neglect of the uncertainty problem in prior analyses of precontractual 
habihty Issues). See also Johnston, supra note 15. at 494 (detailing structural conditions 
under which pretrade performance might be the only way of reducing uncertainty about 
"relatively indistinguishable seller types" to buyers). 
93. Daniel Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law 
and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 922 (1985) (discussing the impor-
tance of benefit to promisor as a reason for finding liability under promissory estoppel). 
See al~o Juliet P. Kostritsky, An Assent Theory of Liability Emerging Under the Guise of 
Pronussory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 895, 943 n.202 
(1987) (documenting importance of benefit to defendant-promisor in finding of liability in 
promissory estoppel cases). 
. 94. Johnston, supra note 15, at 389. Examples of such low cost messages, "cheap talk" 
Include statements such as "everything looks great" or "we are not optimistic." !d. 
95. Id. at 388-89. 
96. !d. at 408-09. 
97. !d. at 390, 409-10. 
98. Id. at 389. 
99. Oliver Williamson highlighted the importance of such transaction-specific invest-
men_ts ~osed for contracts, pointing out that where they existed, a "fundamental transfor-
matiOn occurred that made it more important for parties to control contractual hazards 
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worthless if no contract is formed. The cost means that the information 
may be difficult to procure. The active role that such cooperative invest-
ment reliance can play in reducing uncertainty during the preliminary ne-
gotiation process has been overlooked in analyses of promissory estoppel 
and a liability rule to govern negotiation.100 
The likelihood that a party will invest assets through reliance that will 
be without value if no contract is formed can lead to a problem of oppor-
tunism,101 where one party is exposed and vulnerable to holdup by the 
other party (if that other party defers investing until later on). It is a 
problem of moral hazard or risk that if one invests first, the other party 
may decline to invest at all or to delay investing if it is privately more 
beneficial to do so. 102 This form of strategic behavior is made mor~ prob-
lematic because of the uncertainty that exists with respect to the future 
state of nature and, more importantly, the future behavior of one's 
counterparty. 103 
If one party defers investment until after the other has invested and the 
project succeeds, the parties will negotiate. 104 However, the negotiation 
price will ignore the sunk cost that has already been made; the party who 
has already invested will not recover the reliance in the price since some 
of the surplus will be shared. This is the holdup problem. 105 Parties 
could delay a contract until the resolution of certain of these uncertain-
ties.106 This strategy might lead parties in the direction of delaying per-
formance until a future elate, resulting in an instantaneous exchange 
rather than a deferred-performance contract. Delaying performance 
would eliminate the risk of contracting under uncertainty but would have 
other negative effects, such as loss of benefits of investing early in the 
contract when costs are low. 107 Parties would also be subject to certain 
risks that could be contained by a contract, such as the unavailability of a 
product. 
since transaction-specific investments make a costless exit impossible. See WJLLIAMSr>N. 
supra note 4, at 61-62. 
100. The author noted the neglected connection between reliance ancl the reduction nr 
uncertainty in Kostritsky, supra note 93, at 1313-14. 
101. See id. at 1315. 
102. Presumably it will be beneficial to defer investment because when the surplus is 
split between the parties. the entire portion otherwise available to the non-investing party 
will be there whereas the investing party will gain whatever portion of the surplus would be 
available but there will be no reimbursement for the prior investment by the one party. 
103. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Impcrfccr 
World: What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafied Incomplete 
Contracts, 2004 W1s. L. REv. 323, 340. 
104. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19. at 677-78. 
105. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar. supra note 17, at 432. 
106. Professor Avery Katz discusses delay as a possible response to certain types of 
certainty that will be resolved over time. Katz, supra note 13. at 1268-69. 
107. Katz discusses this concept of the benefits of early investment. See id. at 1267. 
Professors Goetz and Scott originated the term "beneficial reliance" to describe the ways 
in which promisees would adapt in advance of the promise being performed. See C~<1 rles 
J. Goelz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Con-
tract. 89 YALE L.J. 1261. 1267-70 (1980). 
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However, it is far more likely that parties will begin relying on negotia-
tions even before a final agreement is ever reached, leading to a potential 
holdup problem if they do not reach a private agreement to compensate 
the investing party. 
III. THE ALEATORY VIEW OF RELIANCE INVESTMENTS 
Traditionally, under the aleatory view of contracts, which resulted from 
the "knife-edge"108 view of contract liability,109 any reliance undertaken 
in the pre-contractual period was taken at one's own risk and was part of 
an investment in a gamble that might or might not pay off in a consum-
mated transaction. 110 The law denied compensation to parties investing 
in an asset (pre-contract) on the theory that investors "should take the 
risk of wasted investments into account before making them." 111 
TI1e idea that each party invests and gambles on success seems reasona-
ble on one level, and has been justified on the efficiency ground that im-
posing liability during preliminary negotiation "might discourage parties 
from entering negotiations."112 Moreover, where each side is bestowing 
value on the other and, in effect, investing in the possibility of a deal, 
these investments in precommitment action may be offsetting values in 
which the implicit solution is that "I'm gaining as much as I'm giving." 11 3 
Non-protection for large one-sided investments during preliminary 
precontractual negotiation, however, may pose other contracting risks. 
Although perhaps each party should have to take the risk that ordinary 
preliminary search costs that benefit oneself should be non-compensa-
ble, 114 a default rule of non-reimbursement (without an express agree-
ment) may not be optimal, since a rule denying reimbursement would 
discourage trade in some instances. Investments may pose a risk in con-
lOS. Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19, at 675. 
109. Farnsworth. supra note 3. at 221. As Professor Farnsworth explained, under the 
"common law's 'aleatory view' of negotiations: a party that enters negotiations in the hope 
or the gain that will result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results if 
Lhe other party breaks off [the] negotiations." /d. 
110. !d. at 221-22. 
111. Hermalin et al., supra note 6. at 60. 
112. Farnsworth. supra note 3, at 221. 
113. Email from Ronald J. Coffey. Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
(May 7. 2008, 15:04 CST). An example of a case where each party invests sunk costs post-
contract is discussed in Brian JM Quinn's recent article. Quinn. supra note 89, at 2. In that 
c.ase. since. the success of the venture depended on both parties investing and there was the 
nsk that e1ther party would defect from the investments needed to create a successful na-
llonal cable company, @Home used multiple strategies to promote cooperation. One was 
~he economic lock-in, which initially made switching costly. As long as the cost of switch-
~ng was high. the partners would refrain from defecting, allowing @Home to recoup the 
mvestment in cable infrastructure by partnering with Comcast in such a way that @Home 
would acquire subscribers who would take the broadband service. The presence of such 
~ec1procal transaction-specific investments, with the economic-lock-in effect, helped to mit-
Igate opportunistic defection. !d. 
114. This would especially be true if the investments were not transaction-specific. See 
WILLIAMsoN. supra note 4, at 61-62. An exception would apply if the parties reached an 
agreement expressly providing compensation. 
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tracting-particularly if (1) they are transaction specific; (2) they are 
made before the other party has invested, formed a contract, or entered 
into a preliminary agreement; (3) they are invested primarily to benefit 
the other party; 115 and ( 4) if the success and risks of the investment relate 
largely to factors ovet which the promisor has control or which relate to 
the promisor's business needs or its business capacities and not those of 
the promisee-since a promisee may find it difficult to assess the 
probability of a deal being successful. If unaddressed, this risk will act as 
a drag on gains from trade.116 
Differences in the nature of risks that parties would be willing to as-
sume as part of the cost of doing business may exist. Parties might be 
willing to consider some types of investment, as one judge described it, 
"part of the overhead expenses of his business which he hopes will be met 
out of the profits of such contracts as are made," especially when each 
party invests simultaneously. 117 If, however, a party makes investments 
known as "cooperative investments,"118 whiCh benefit the noninvesting 
party, without simultaneously lowering costs for the investing party 
should the deal go through, it may be harder to provide appropriate in- . 
centives for such investments when contracts are incomplete ex ante. 119 
The aleatory view may be founded on an erroneous assumption that 
each party would invest simultaneously, and neither party would be sub-
ject to the particular problem of holdup that occurs with sequential in-
vestment.120 It may assume that each party would invest a certain amount 
of parallel search and lawyer costs to ascertain whether a deal is profita-
ble. If so, the aleatory view denying recovery for precontractual reliance 
may have survived on assumptions that ignore the potential problem that 
arises with sequential investment.l21 Sequential investment can occur (1) 
115. See Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 126 (discussing cooperative-type 
investments). 
116. Vernon Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 465, 466 (2003). 
117. Farnsworth, wpra note 3, at 221 (quoting William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd. v. Davis 
[1957)1 W.L.R. 932 (Q.B.)) 
118. See Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 126. 
119. See Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, Contract Damages and Cooperative In-
vestments, 30 RAND J. OF EcoN. 84, 103 (1999). This Article assumes that the parties can-
not contract ex ante on the ideal investment because of difficulties in specifying 
"investment-related information." Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 125. Therefore, a con-
tract cannot curb the opportunism that necessarily accompanies transaction-specific invest-
ments. If such investments could be contracted on, then parties would invest optimally but 
without such contracts a party will invest suboptimally. !d. Even in the absence of a con-
tract that would guarantee optimal investment, parties could enter into an incomplete con-
tract and renegotiate subsequently "to the quantity that is ex post efficient." !d. at 126. 
Even if such renegotiation might result in suboptimal investment because an investing 
party might not receive all of the surplus due to inequalities in bargaining power, there ~re 
independent reasons and incentives to invest. Those reasons might mean that even wtth 
incomplete contracts and the possibility of renegotiation ex post, "an appropriately chosen 
initial contract can provide the right incentives for investments." !d. However, these opti-
mal results could only be achieved if selfish, non-cooperative investments, are made. !d. 
120. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 676-78. 
121. William P. Rogerson, Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 r:-Ev. 
EcoN. STUD. 777, 777 (1992). The aleatory view was accepted without critical analysts of 
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in precontractual negotiation when one party (the putative offeror) de-
lays investment to collect information on putative offerees, and (2) fol-
lowing explicit agreements in which one party delays investment to 
increase its private advantage. 
This Article suggests that courts analyzing the normative question of 
whether reliance should be compensated should pay particular attention 
to whether the danger of holdup with sequential investment is present, 
regardless of whether it occurs because one party has acted strategically 
for private gain in delaying a simultaneously agreed-to investment, or be-
cause there is an incentive by putative offerors to delay investment to 
resolve one or more uncertainties. It is no longer possible to rationalize 
the denial of all compensation for reliance under one universal theory of 
gambling on risk in which each party could and should judge what each is 
willing to invest in a gamble when there is no guaranteed success in out-
come. While one should make certain types of investments at one's own 
risk, particularly when the other party is making simultaneous invest-
ments and thus maximizing the chances that a deal will materialize, the 
willingness to invest and the nature of the risks involved may change ei-
ther when the investment is a cooperative investment thal is likely to be 
of most benefit to the other party or when the investment subjects the 
investing party to the risk of holdup. For that reason, the aleatory view of 
contract that denies all compensation for precontractual reliance should 
be reexamined. 
IV. THE HOLDUP PROBLEM 
To fully understand the problem of sequential investment in precon-
tractual negotiation, the holdup problem, and the law's possible re-
sponses, one must examine (1) how and when parties rely when contracts 
are incomplete and (2) the risks that are posed by such reliance 
investment. 
The investment of a transaction-specific sunk cost can render one vul-
nerable to the problem of hold up. Holdup may occur at several stages of 
the bargaining process. If a party invests sunk costs during precontrac-
tual negotiation without a binding commitment from the other party, the 
other party may exploit that investment by holding out for a higher 
price-a larger share of the surplus. The investing party risks losing all of 
the investment if no deal is consummated and so is vulnerable to this kind 
of pressure.122 Hobbes himself identified this vulnerability as fundamen-
!ts underlying assumptions, so it is hard to know whether the aleatory theory of reliance 
mvestment continues to make sense once the holdup problem is accounted for. See John-
ston, supra note 15, at 388. 
122. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REv. 481, 
492 (199?)· Holdup can of course occur at a later point in time after contracts have been 
ente~ed mto. ~s parties begin to invest in what Williamson calls "special purpose technol-
?gy, t?e partJes' ability to deal with strategic behavior by simply terminating becomes 
Impossible. WJLLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 32. It is for that reason that Williamson thinks 
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tal to explaining the need for enforcement in contract. 123 Because these 
investments may be unverifiable 124 or uncertain ahead of time, ex ante 
contracting on such reliance investments may be impossible.t25 Con-
tracting ex ante may be particularly difficult when one party is afforded 
discretion to "gear up" or "work hard," and it is clear that the party urg-
ing such investment broadly wants investments that will place the 
noninvesting party in the position of being ready to proceed should a 
contract materialize, but the exact nature of such desired investments is 
fuzzy, in part because it is the non-investing party who is most familiar 
with the business that will utilize the investments. 126 
One way to provide incentives to make efficient investments when ex 
ante contracting is difficult is through an ex ante agreement to divide the 
surplus in such a way that those parties who invest more receive a greater 
share of the surplus. 127 Yet where the projects undertaken have an un-
verifiable surplus, such efforts to reward and protect reliance investments 
will not work. 128 
Without such ex ante contractual protection, the investing party has to 
depend on ex post arrangements. 129 However, the postponement makes 
the investing party vulnerable to his expenses not being recouped in the 
surplus. 130 TI1is vulnerability disincentivizes investment in future transac-
tions and discourages trade from occurring in the first place. A party may 
be reluctant to undertake significant costs without some safeguard.l3 1 In 
a recurring pattern in the case law, party B is uncertain of party A's abil-
ity to perform, and party A makes investments to reduce that uncertainty. 
Under some circumstances-particularly where the investment by A has 
that ·'[g]ovemance structures that attenuate opportunism and otherwise infuse conridencc 
are evidently needed." !d. at 63. 
123. THOMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR, THE MATTER, FoRM, AND PowER OF A Co!VJ-
MONWEALTH, EccLESIASTICAL AND CrvrL 69 (2d ed., London, George Routledge & Sons 
1886) (1651). 
124. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov. Contracting on Ti111e. 95 AIVL EcoN. REv. 1369. 
1369 (2005 ). 
125. See Battigali & Maggi, supra note 56, at SOL 
126. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 677-78. 
127. !d. at 678. 
128. !d.; see also Che & Hausch, supra note 34. at 125 n.l (detailing difficulties in con-
trolling opportunism in contracts when "specific investments often take a nonmonetary. 
intangible form such as human capital investment"). 
129. !d. at 677-78. 
130. !d. 
131. See WILUAMSON, supra note 4, at 32-33 (suggesting that parties will seek sare-
guards against hazards in order to increase the overall gain from trade). Transactions with-
out safeguards pose a higher risk and will be priced accordingly. !d. at 33. To solve thrs 
problem, Jason Johnston has proposed a rule making the non-investing party liable for 
pre trade performance (a form of reliance) in order to encourage those who are pessnmst1c 
about a trade occurring to speak up. Johnston. supra note 15. at 397. This Article suggests 
that the problem is one of uncertainty that makes the noninvesting party uncertain about 
whether a trade will occur until the investment is made rather than concealment of the true 
probabilities. 11ms, this Article suggests adopting a default rule for solicited investments 
that are useful in mitigating uncertainty for one party. TI1at rule should apply as a default 
rule because the soliciting party is often uncertain about whether a trade will occur but 
needs and is benefited by an investment. 
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no value outside the potential bargain with B 132-the parties would ei-
ther expressly or impliedly agree to protect A in making that investment. 
If obstacles exist to contractually protecting such transaction-specific in-
vestments, and if it is an investment that would not otherwise occur, or 
where the incentive to invest would be suboptimal or the incentive to 
enter future transactions would be jeopardized, the law would have an 
interest in protecting the value of that investment by recognizing and en-
forcing that express or implied agreement to reimburse such 
investments. 133 
Prior scholarly analyses of reliance investments have evaluated reliance 
from the perspective of providing optimal incentives for parties to engage 
in efficient reliance, given the probabilities of a trade occurring.134 The 
law encourages efficient behavior by reimbursing parties only when they 
engage in efficient reliance, but not otherwise. That approach prevents 
parties from wasting assets towards the realization of transactions when 
the likelihood of success is too low .135 These analyses evaluate a reliance 
decision as a cost-benefit analysis that occurs at a moment in time. 136 
In deciding whether to invest reliance costs, a party looks at how an 
investment will benefit the investing party. Using a Learned Hanel ap-
proach to reliance investment, 137 scholars have urged that efficient reli-
ance occurs when the investment is worth the cost. The cost is measured 
by the investment that will be lost if the deal does not materialize, and the 
benefit is measured by the benefits that will accrue if the deal goes 
through. The investing party weighs the probability of the trade material-
izing in order to determine whether an investment is justified. 138 Craswell 
argues that judicial decisions often reach results consistent with the pro-
tection of efficient reliance.139 
132. As Avery Katz makes clear. 
the only reliance investments needing protection are those that are specific to 
the transaction or relationship. If the offeree's investment is fully salvage-
able through resale or a substitute contract. then there is no holdup problem. 
Because the offeree can then make the offeror compete against all other pos-
sible market uses for the investment, he will have all the bargaining power 
Jnd [the offeror) will have none. 
Kat? .. supra note 13, at 1276 n.76. 
l 33. TI1e problem of the presence of idiosyncratic sunk costs deterring professionals 
from entering service contracts. such as construction, because of the danger of ex post 
holdup, has been studied. See Tom K. Lee & Ivan P.L. Png, The Role of Installment Pay-
mems in Contracts for Services, 21 RAND J. oF EcoN. 83, 83-84 (1990). Lee and Png sug-
gest that installment payments can incentivize greater initial efforts, as would a law-
supplied rule implying an installment payment scheme to provide incentives to enter con-
tracts where the danger of holdup would otherwise deter such contracts. Jd. at 95. 
134. See e.g., Craswell, supra note 122, at 484, 491-92. 
135. ld. at 493. 
136. See also Katz, supra note 13, at 1269. 
_137. Sometimes the parties themselves will engage in efficient reliance calculations 
~vJthout the l~w having _to intervene. At other times, the parties may have insufficient 
mcentJves to mvest, partJcularly when the prospect of a holdup problem looms large. See 
Craswell, supra note 122. at 491. 
138. ld. 
139. ld. at 507. 
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Under this cost-benefit approach, a promisee will not want to invest 
too early when the probability of a trade occurring is low140 but will not 
want to delay investment too long since some of the benefits of investing 
in the deal early would be lost. 
A significant drawback to the cost-benefit approach as a method for 
determining whether the law should impose liability for reliance costs on 
the other party-a normative question-is that it ignores the essential 
structural problem of sequential investment that may result in a distor-
tion of reliance incentives through the holdup problem. 141 
The notion that a party will invest efficiently given the probabilities of 
a future trade occurring is only true if one ignores that, if there is no 
enforceable commitment from the other party, an investing party is in a 
vulnerable position once the investment is made. Once a promisee has 
invested first before a contract is formed, he becomes subject to holdup 
by the other party and will have a reduced incentive to invest.142 Antici-
pating this possibility, a promisee may forego a trade even if there are 
gains from the trade. Even if a bargain is struck later, the investing party 
will not be able to capture all of the gain in the bargain.143 Whoever 
invests first is subject to this loss, and under such circumstances "invest-
ment will be inefficient."144 This is because the party "would invest only 
until the marginal cost equaled [the] fraction of the expected gain." 145 
A different but equally problematic version of the holdup problem can 
also occur if "the distribution of ex ante costs across the parties is suffi-
ciently 'mis-matched' with the distribution of surplus."146 In that case, an 
investing party may be disinclined to invest because the amount that it 
140. !d. at 493. See also Katz, supra note 13, at 1268. 
141. Craswell, supra note 122. at 493 (discussing the "distortion" in incentives 
problem). 
142. This would not be true if the parties could contract in advance on the amount to be 
invested and if the "party whose expected return is positive [could] guarantee his partner a 
nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse his partner for investment costs if the project 
is not pursued." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 683. Contracting difficulties, however, 
may make this impossible, particularly where the party investing is given broad discretion 
to perform by gearing up or working hard. Such discretionary actions make contracting 
costly, if not impossible. !d. at 682-83. 
143. As Professor Craswe!l explains: "[The] ability [of the noninvestor] to hold out for 
a share of B's profits is what distorts B's reliance incentives in the absence of a binding 
commitment. B must still bear all the downside risks of his reliance, for if it becomes 
inefficient for S to perform, then she will walk away from the deal without paying anything. 
But if B's reliance becomes worthwhile-that is, if it becomes efficient for S to perform-
then B will not capture all of the gains from his reliance because S may extract some of 
those gains by holding out for a higher price." Craswell, supra note 122, at 492. 
144. Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, Hold-Up and Sequential Specific Investments, 
35 RAND I. EcoN. 386, 386 (2004). . 
145. Schwartz & Scott, sup1:a note 19, at 679. One possible solution that would result tn 
the party investing efficiently would be to allow that party an option of making it. a "take-
it-or-leave-it-offer" to the non-investing party. That prospect would permit the mvestmg 
party the option of recovering all of the surplus and would encourage efficient reliance. 
However, these solutions are dependent on an assumption of no renegotiation, which can-
not be guaranteed, so these solutions will not solve the underinvestment problem. !d. 
146. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the 
Coase Theorem, 116 EcoN. I. 223, 229 (2006). 
2008] Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations 1397 
receives in surplus will not cover the investment.147 As Craswell deftly 
explains: 
[A]ny reliance by. B mus~ mak~ consummatio~ of the deal more im-
portant to hi~, sm~e rehance mcreases the difference b~twee~ the 
benefit B receives 1f S performs, and the loss B suffers If S fails to 
perform. But once consummation of the deal becomes more impor-
tant to B, S can exploit this by threatening not to perform unless B 
agrees to pay her a higher price. 148 
This structural hazard of holdup can be looked at as a specific example 
of the general problem of opportunism. The investing party does not 
know ahead of time whether the party soliciting the sunk cost will strate-
gically use the investment by denying the investing party the full benefit, 
either in the negotiated bargain or in a side payment of reimbursement. 
TI1e promisee is subject to the risk that if a bargain is ever reached 
between them, it "will compensate [only] the promisor for the investment 
[costs]. ... "1 49 The disincentive to invest ex ante could be exacerbated if 
the part of the surplus available to the investing party did not even cover 
the ex ante investment costs. The promisee, because of a poor bargaining 
position that exists when he has sunk costs and the promisor does not, 
could theoretically, following the sinking of such costs, tell the promisor 
that he will not proceed, but such a "threat to exit unless his investment 
costs are reimbursed is not credible."150 
In any project, the parties choose when to begin investing. Each party 
can invest at the same time, or one party can defer investment until after 
the first party has invested. Each of these investment regimes may be 
efficient or inefficient in different circumstances, and each legal regime 
governing such factual scenarios may address or exacerbate the problems 
of holdup, or incentives to invest, or create a new problem of follow-up 
opportunism.151 
Sometimes sequential investment may be necessary as an antidote to a 
certain type of holdup problem. If a financer lends funds to a new and 
untested entrepreneur (a species of the uncertainty problem) at the same 
time that the entrepreneur makes contractual promises to repay, the fi-
nancer may decline to lend, as lending will yield a negative retum.152 The 
14~. {d. ~t 230. Anderlini and Felli explain that "the parties will pay the costs only if 
the d1stnbutwn of the surplus generated by the negotiation will allow them to recoup the 
C?st .ex post." I d. That may not occur if there is a mis-match between investment and 
d1stn~ution of the surplus. I d. at 229. The authors point to a famous incident involving a 
deciSIOn b~ a smal.l research company (that had an operating system for PCs that IBM was 
mterested m acqUiring rights to) to refuse to make the necessary preliminary investments 
because of a fear of a holdup by IBM. I d. at 227. That decision was an inefficient outcome 
caused by the fear of holdup. ld. 
148. Craswell, supra note 122, at 492. 
149. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666. 
150. ld. at 666 n.12. 
151. Smirnov & Wait, supra note 144, at 388. 
R 152. ld. at 392 (discussing D.V. Neher, Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective, 66 Ev. EcoN. STUD. 255 (1999)). 
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financer will be subject to a risk of holdup or moral hazard by the entre-
preneur, who can appropriate the loaned funds without building a com-
pany or any assets. This is a form of opportunistic behavior by a 
borrower. 
In such cases, sequential or staged investment by the financer or staged 
financing could provide a needed antidote or safeguard to the financer, 
without which the financer would not lend. If the financer loaned all of 
the money up front to start up a project, for example, the financer would 
be subject to the moral hazard of the entrepreneur expropriating the cash 
without using it to make the venture profitable or engaging in a holdup 
and asking for a renegotiation of more favorable terms. Since the fi-
nancer has little leverage at the point where the project is yet unbuilt, the 
financer might make concessions in order to recover some of the money. 
This is the problem posed by a kind of investment in which one party 
invests everything up front, leading to a moral hazard/holdup problem. 
To alleviate the problem, the financer could tie lending to the entrepre-
neur to the stages when assets are built up in the new company, thereby 
rendering the financer less subject to holdup. 153 Once the assets are es-
tablished, the financer will have the ability to realize monies to cover any 
default by the borrower. 154 In such a case, deferred investment is there-
fore a private strategy to curb holdup by the entrepreneur. 
In other cases, however, rather than being a response to a hold up 
problem, sequential investment may be a form of strategic or opportunis-
tic behavior that may need to be controlled through a law-supplied de-
fault rule. 155 
The promisee sinking costs that leave him vulnerable to hold up will act 
as a disincentive to reliance investment if there is no reimbursement for 
such reliance costs. 156 For that reason, this Article suggests that because 
the same danger of moral hazard exists whenever a promisor faces uncer-
tainty about the nature of the ultimate transaction and deliberately delays 
any investment until the promisee has invested during precontractual ne-
gotiations, or when a party agrees to invest simultaneously and then de-
lays to gain a private advantage following a preliminary agreement, the 
law should consider in each case what rules to craft to reduce the costs of 
a hold up. That may involve formulating a liability default rule that com-
pensates the investing party. 
In the next section, the Article will trace how the threat of hold up 
permeates both precontractual negotiation (the Hoffman type case) and 
preliminary agreements that involve an express agreed to sequence of si-
multaneous investment. It argues that the two phases both involve a uni-
153. !d. 
154. Id. 
155. For a discussion of opportunism and its costs if uncontrolled, see WrLLIAMSON. 
supra note 4, at 63 (including the risk that "gains [can] be dissipated by costly subgoal 
pursuit"). . . 
156. Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 425. Contrary to what one n11gh~ ex-
pect, the problem of underinvestment can occur even if both parties invest. !d. at 4.J2. 
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fied threat and should therefore be considered part of one problem 
demanding judicial attention. 
v. PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS AND PRECONTRACTUAL 
NEGOTIATION: TWO CONTEXTS BUT 
ONE RISK OF HOLD UP 
Schwartz and Scott have provided particular guidance to solve one type 
of hold up problem-that of one party acting opportunistically following 
preliminary agreement on some_terms _and an agreement by both parti_es 
to invest simultaneously, followmg which one party chooses to delay Its 
investment.l 57 The delay gives one party the advantages associated with 
sequential investment and constitutes a form of holdup.158 As the authors 
point out, one party may have "an incentive to defect from any such 
agreement" 159 because "by delaying her decision whether to invest until 
after the promisee has invested ... [ t]he promisor benefits from defection 
if the project turns out to be unprofitable because she will not have sunk 
costs in a losing deal." 160 
These preliminary agreements often take the form of letters of intent 
or other agreements in which parties agree to some, but not all, terms and 
postpone negotiation of those open terms until a later date. 161 Depend-
ing on the parties' intentions, these preliminary agreements may be either 
(1) fully enforceable;l 62 (2) not binding at all if the parties have indicated 
their intent that no enforceable contract would exist absent a further for-
mal agreement;l 63 or (3) binding only in the sense of committing the par-
ties to bargain in good faith towards a profitable outcome.164 
157. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666-67. 
158. !d. at 682. 
159. !d. at 666. 
160. !d. (emphasis added). 
161. !d. at 664. See also Johnston, supra note 15, at 450. TI1is postponement of some 
terms with an agreement reached in stages is particularly likely to occur in ·~corporate 
mergers or acquisitions, commercial lending, executive employment, and the sale of highly 
customized goods." !d. at 449-50. 
162. Preliminary agreements will be interpreted as fully enforceable if the parties in-
tend the final written contract to act merely as a memorial of a fully negotiated agreement. 
!d. at 467. See also United States v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 224 F. 859. 862-23 (2cl Cir. 
1915). 
163. See e.g.. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 71, 75 (2d Cir. 
1984); see also Feldman v. Alleghency Int'l, 850 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) (cited in 
PFT Robertson, Inc. v. Volvo trucks N.A., Inc., 420 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2005), wherein Judge 
Easterbrook explained Feldman as holding that "Illinois is averse to enforcing tentative 
agreements that are expressly contingent on the signing of formal or final documents") 
164. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664. See also Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. 
!nbun~ Co., 670 F. Supp. 491. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (providing a framework for determin-
mg \~h1ch preliminary agreements would be considered binding commitments that required 
partJes to bargain in good faith toward a final contract). Courts developed a multi-factor 
test to determine the parties' intent in these preliminary agreements. Johnston, supra note 
15. at 468. However, such tests have resulted in "doctrinal ambiguity." fd. at 467. Profes-
sor Johnsto~ fi~ds fault with the current tests for judging whether preliminary agreements 
~haul~ be_ bmdmg due to the uncertainty posed by applying tests that depend on "ex post 
mvestJgatJOn of negotiating history." Jd. at 474-75. 
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After such agreements, one or both parties may rely, and when such 
agreements exist, both parties are obligated to abide by an obligation of 
good faith to reach an ultimate agreement.165 If one party invests and the 
other party breaches its obligation to act in good faith (triggered by the 
binding preliminary agreement), then those reliance costs may be com-
pensable.166 These interim agreements protect reliance investments if a 
court decides that a preliminary agreement is binding in the third sense 
above, and one party has breached by refusing to bargain in good faith.l67 
The threat of such a liability rule encourages parties to live up to their 
obligations of good faith and permits both parties to invest and rely effi-
ciently.168 The law-supplied obligation of good faith discourages the 
problem of holdup that might otherwise exist. 169 
Schwartz and Scott have reinvigorated the study of these preliminary 
agreements contexts by identifying the problem of holdup. 170 Such 
holdup demanded new scrutiny. Irr their recent article, they note that 
165. Teachers Ins .. 670 F. Supp. at 498; see also Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Con-
tract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 681 (1960). 
166. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664-65. Schwartz and Scott argue that the 
emerging new legal rule requires a party to compensate the other party for reliance costs 
when there has been a breach of an agreement to invest simultaneously. !d. at 667, 675. 
However. Schwartz and Scott, while applauding the tendency of courts to reach outcomes 
awarding reliance investment to the investing party against the party who has delayed in-
vestment, find the legal approach that ties the liability to the obligation of good faith to be 
"deficient" and "unnecessary." in part because of the lack of clarity about the scope and 
content of the good faith obligation. !d. at 667. Schwartz and Scott would award reliance 
costs whenever there has been a breach of the agreed-on investment sequence. fd. This 
Article argues that the reason for imposing an obligation of good faith. and with it a liabil-
ity rule to govern breaches of bad faith. is linked to the obligation to prevent opportunism 
and holdup. TI1e problem with jettisoning good faith and grounding the liability rule in the 
breach of an agreed on investment sequence is that it is not a broad enough basis to permit 
courts to impose liability in the precontractuql phase where there is no agreed upon invest-
ment sequence and no preliminary agreement. Rather than limit the obligation to com-
pensate for reliance investments to an ex ante agreement to invest simultaneously, the law 
should look at when intervention is justified to prevent holdup problems that occur at 
different phases of negotiation and contracting. It can occur in cases where the parties 
have breached an agreement to invest simultaneously, but it can also apply in other set-
tings not involving an express agreement to invest simultaneously. Thus, the question be-
comes how and when can a liability rule obligating one party to reimburse the other party 
for reliance costs be justified? An obligation of good faith is simply a broad legal rubric 
that provides a foundation for protecting reliance costs when doing so is necessary to pre-
vent opportunistic behavior. This might be the situation in a case involving no preliminary 
agreement at alL as in Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y. 1917) (finding implied 
obligation to use reasonable best efforts to deter opportunistic behavior that would other-
wise occur if marketer could enter into exclusive contract but then fail to use any efforts 
thereby depriving designer of any profits at all), or in the context of precontractual negoti-
ations that do not result in any preliminary agreement or any agreed-on investment 
sequence. 
167. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 667. 
168. !d. at 696 (hypothesizing good incentive effect from liability rule in terms of en-
couraging duty to invest simultaneously following preliminary agreement). 
169. Schwartz and Scott would streamline the process and dispense with the need to 
determine whether the obligation of good faith was breached by making liability turn 
solely on whether verifiable reliance investments were made by one party after one party 
breached a promise to invest simultaneously and then delayed doing so. !d. at 686-87. 
170. !d. at 682, 685. 
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holdup occurs when one party invests and the other party, who had prom-
ised to invest simultaneously, delays its investment.m That delay would 
subject the investing party to ex post holdup because the investing party 
may suffer when the other party declines to invest simultaneously.1 T2 
Such delay by one party can subject the investing party to the prospect of 
a negative return on the transaction. 173 Because there is some unknown 
probability of such hold up occurring,174 parties will simply decline to 
invest or transact175 as a means of self-protection. This results in lost 
oains from trade. 176 
b 
Schwartz and Scott argue that reliance investments should be compen-
sated when they arise in the course of such preliminary agreements if one 
party has promised to invest simultaneously (and the investment is 
needed for a successful project) but has deferred investment for strategic 
reasons. 177 The authors provide case law evidence that courts reach re-
sults to protect reliance investment in such fact patterns.178 
The identification of hold up by Schwartz and Scott as a reason for 
protecting reliance expenditures advances the understanding of one prob-
lem that arises when parties rely after reaching preliminary agreements 
and agreements to invest simultaneously, and one party subsequently 
'"defects" from this plan.J79 Prior judicial determinations of the compen-
sability of reliance investments following preliminary agreements turned 
on ascertaining the parties' intent, but that approach failed to provide 
adequate guidance to courts.180 Although many courts have apparently 
reached results consistent with Schwartz and Scott's thesis,181 they have 
done so without specific guidance on the normative importance of a 
deviation from an agreed on investment plan and the danger of an ex post 
holdup. 
171. ld. at 686. 
172. ld. 
173. ld. at 685. 
174. !d. at 686 n.64 (detailing particular circumstances in which "the prospect of [] 
breach can be sufficiently great to deter the buyer from participating"). Then parties 
:vould make Bayesian estimates about the likelihood of a departure from the agreed on 
mvestment sequence. 
175. fd. Rt 686. 
176. When the parties have actually reached an agreement, albeit one that is incom-
plete on the surplus division, there may be a different kind of hold up that occurs as a 
result of renegotiation. If one party invests, and the parties cannot commit not to renegoti-
a_te, then after investment, a party who invested "seldom could bargain to capture the en-
tire gam.'' ld. at 679. T11at would lessen the incentive to invest as the non-investing party 
would through renegotiation be able to capture some of the surplus. 
177. ld. at 685-86. T11e example given by Schwartz & Scott involves a doctor who in-
vests i~ a practice by moving and joining a practice with the expectation that the practice 
would mvest by training the doctor. ld. at 695. If the practice declined to invest in training 
after promising to do so, then the doctor would be subject to hold up. !d. 
178. For a list of cases, see id. at 694-702. 
179. T11is would facilitate efficient investment because there are instances where "the 
buyer's expected return ... is negative without the reliance offset and positive with it. [so] 
a _buyer who expects to recover reliance will make a preliminary agreement that he other-
WISe would have rejected." ld. at 686. 
180. !d. at 675. 
181. For a list of cases, see id. at 694-702. 
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Schwartz and Scott's analysis of many factual scenarios in which parties 
reach a preliminary agreement and an agreement to invest simultane-
ously and then one delays while the other relies, identifies a key factor 
that correlates with a plaintiff's likely success on a reliance claim. That 
factor could logically be applied to other cases of reliance not involving 
agreements to invest simultaneously. If so applied, it suggests a broad 
justificative framework. That framework suggests that where one party's 
reliance leaves it vulnerable to hold up, a liability rule might be required 
to prevent problems of under-reliance and to encourage transacting that 
might otherwise not occur.ts:z Schwartz and Scott, however, conclude 
that to determine whether a reliance claim should be compensable, courts 
should ascertain if the parties reached a preliminary agreement that in-
cluded a planned sequence of investment. 183 Where both parties agree to 
invest simultaneously, and one party strategically delays investment for 
private benefit, the party who delays should be liable to the other party 
for verifiable reliance costs.l84 Liability would be optimal since the as-
sumption is that the greatest gains from trade would have been realized 
from simultaneous investment. When one party defers investment for 
private gain (the same problem that a principal faces with a shirking 
agent l85 ), that behavior acts as a drag on gains from trade that should be 
controlled. 
Although Schwartz and Scott's suggested liability rule is a narrow one 
and involves (1) reliance investments, (2) undertaken after a preliminary 
agreement is reached, and (3) after an express agreement is reached that 
obligates both parties to undertake simultaneous investment, this Article 
contends that their analytical framework can and should be extended to 
the precontractual negotiation context, an area that many scholars, in-
cluding Schwartz and Scott, contend demonstrates "scant support in the 
law of contracts'' for liability. 186 What prompts Schwartz and Scott to 
182. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar. supra note 17. at 431-32. 
183. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19. at 704. 
184. !d. at 686-87 (pointing to the fact that a "portion of the buyer's investment cost ... 
is verifiable ex post," even if not ex ante contractible). 
185. See, e.g.. Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214. 214-15 (N.Y. 1917). 
186. Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19, at 669. When Schwartz and Scott argued that 
Hoffinan is "wrong as a matter of doctrine," id. at 670, they did so partly on the basis that 
the Restatemmr itself contains only a single definition of "promise" and there is no sepa-
rate section between promises that induce unbargained for reliance and promises that are 
"the product of a bargained-for exchange." ld. at 669-70. The fact that the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts makes no distinction within Section 2 itself can best be understood 
by the fact that a separate section exists on the definition of an offer in Section 24. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 2, 24 (1981). When a promise reaches the pomt 
where it constitutes an offer, that is the point at which one can conclude that there is a 
bargained for exchange; the offeror has named the price that would make him better off tf 
the offeree were to accept. TI1us. one could certainly argue that the drafters of t~e Restate-
ment knew how to make a distinction. and when the drafters defined "promise" m SectiOn 
2. they deliberately did not use the word offer. In not doing so and using the word prom-
ise. they were distinguishing it from cases in which the putative offeror had reached t_he 
point that he names the price on which he is willing to be bound, as in a bargained tor 
exchange in Sections 24 and 71. Had they intended the word "promise" in Section 90 to 
have the more fully developed meaning of an offer, they could have done so, as they dtd m 
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determine that the delay in a planned simultaneous investment should 
lead to liability is that one party has acted strategically to delay because 
that delay would be privately beneficial, though not mutually, benefi-
ciaJ1~7 and would have the negative effect of discouraging buyers from 
pursuing efficient projects. The decision to impose liability for breaches 
of agreed-on investment plans cannot be answered reflexively without in-
voking a normative framework. That framework is built on certain as-
sumptions about how parties are likely to behave in the absence of any 
rule and what effect it will have on the parties' goal of maximizing wel-
fare. In certain cases one party will benefit from delay, especially when 
the likelihood of success is high and the investment cost is significant. 188 
Waiting will allow the party to recover investments through the ex post 
bargain. Investments made beforehand would not be recoverable because 
they would already have been sunk at the time of the bargain. 
Under a consequentialist framework, investors would anticipate that 
non-investors would act opportunistically and would not believe promises 
by non-investors to refrain from such behavior. 189 Consequently, inves-
tors would forego opportunities as the only means of protecting them-
selves against the possible negative returns that occur when sellers defer 
investment. 190 
The problems with deferring investment are twofold. First, even if si-
multaneous investment would be ideal, one party may depart from the 
ideal to increase private gain, causing a reduction in gains from trade. 
Second, the anticipation of this strategic behavior may cause some parties 
to refuse to participate at all because they fear the breach of their 
counterparty's promise to invest simultaneously. Efficient deals there-
fore will not take place. 191 A liability rule for broken promises to invest 
simultaneously encourages parties to invest optimally and could solve the 
hold up problem. 
This Article suggests that a liability rule for reliance expenses should be 
adopted more broadly to apply whenever there is a structural problem 
posed by sequential investment, at least where private solutions may be 
more costly or less effective than law-supplied rules. TI1is problem of 
hold up is particularly likely to occur when the putative promisor seeks 
Section 87. In Section 87 the drafters used the word "offer" to refer to cases in which the 
!?esraremenr will enforce offers that induce reliance, thereby suggesting that Section 90. if it 
Is lo h~ve any separate meaning and not be superfluous, must mean "promise" to refer to 
commitments that do no! rise to the level of a full-fledged offer and are therefore less fully 
formed. Further. even beyond the textual arguments, to decide whether the Hoffman 
court ~lad any precedenlial support for construing "promise" in Section 90. to refer to a 
commitment that did not reach the level of an offer. one would have to analyze case law. 
Certamly. !here are cases in which courts, prior to Hoffman, enforced promises and con-
strue? language to constitute an actionable promise under Section 90 even if it did not 
constitute an offer. 
187. Thus. there may be social advantages for both parties to invest simultaneously. 
188. Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19, at 685. 
189. ld. at 686 (discussing the problem of credibility of promises to invest). 
190. l d. at 685-86. 
191. ld. at 686. 
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investment from the promisee to alleviate uncertainty about the prom-
isee.192 The putative offeror makes promises intended to cause the other 
party to invest sunk costs that can reduce uncertainty about the investing 
party in a manner that will allow the promisor to decide whether to pro-
ceed at all, and if so, on what terms that will permit some other uncertain-
ties to be resolved or will allow one party to hedge. The parties may not 
be in a position early on to agree on what each must invest193 since they 
are not even sure that they are going to proceed. 
Not being able to contract ahead of time on the investments poses 
problems for investment.l94 Contracts remain incomplete and fail to pro-
vide certain contractual protection for investments made. Another prob-
lem is that the best timing for the investment may not be clear ahead of 
time, 195 and that uncertainty may mean that parties can act strategically 
once investments have been made by one party. Other efforts to protect 
specific investments may be unavailing as well. These might include an 
effort to "contract on surplus" in such a way that the party investing more 
ahead of time is given a "larger share" of the surplus ex post. 196 Then, 
even if contractual sblutions were unavailing, parties could leave the com-
pensation issue to ex post negotiations. Such arrangements, however, 
could discourage investment because they would present the classic 
holdup problem since in those cases, "the investing party generally does 
not appropriate the full marginal retutns on the irtvestment." 197 
When a p1'omisee invests at this preliminary stage and is not protected 
by any contractual agreement, the problem of sequential investment 
presents itself with its attendant risk of underinvestment and lost trading 
opportunities. 198 Once the promisee invests, he faces the possibility that 
no deal will materialize and he will lose his investment. Even if a deal 
materializes, the investing party may not be able to recover all of the 
benefits in the price. The investment will render him subject to a holdup 
prospect.199 All of this will lessen his incentive to invest and cause him to 
forego trading opportunities unless safeguards are provided either 
through private agreements or law-supplied debult rules. The risk is the 
same in all of these cases: the investing party will be subject to the other 
party appropriating part of the benefit in the negotiated surplus. 
192. This would be true even if there is no agreement to invest simultaneously. 
193. This makes the investments non-contractible. 
194. Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 125 n.1 (detailing impediments to direct con-
tracting on the investments including the fact that "specific investments often take a non-
monetary. intangible form, such as human capital investment"). See also Rogerson, supra 
note 121. at 777 (discussing need to make "non-contractible specific investments prior to 
the transaction in order to prepare for it"). 
195. Rogerson, supra note 121, at 777. 
196. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19. at 678-79. 
197. Guriev & Kvasov, supra note 124. at 1369. 
198. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar. supra note 17, at 431-32. 
199. The problem may be even more severe if there is a ''mis-match" in surplus. See 
Anderlini & Felli, supra note 146, at 230. 
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In this recurring situation one can conceptualize the position of the 
promisee and the putative prom~sor as one in which the promis~e grants 
the putative prom1sor the authonty to proceed to collect enough mforma-
tion, but only if the promisor will commit not to act opportunistically in 
the pricing of the deal should a contract be achieved. A commitment to 
refrain from acting opportunistically would not be credible because once 
the investment is sunk, the promisee will not be able to earn all the bene-
fit from it.:wo That promise would also be difficult to make credible in 
part because courts might not enforce such a vague promise. 201 Moreo-
ver, because of the uncertainty problem, promisees do not know how 
trustworthy their counterparties are and thus, they do not know whether 
the promisor's commitment should be trusted. If all of the possible sunk 
costs that the promisor desired could be specified and priced in advance, 
then the promisor might agree that the investing party will receive a 
"nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse the partner for investment 
costs if the project is not pursued."202 When such investments are "non-
contractible," for example, when the promisor urges the promisee to 
"gear up" or "work hard," that solution will not work. 203 TI1e particular 
problem of holdup occasioned by sequential investment, which occurs 
when one party seeks to reduce its own uncertainty or to hedge, could be 
cured if each party bargained over each incremental step and negotiated 
a price to pay for such investment. Then investment would only occur on 
the payment of a price and ex post holdup would not occur. The down-
side of bargaining in such a way is that it would be costly and add to the 
transaction costs of preliminary negotiations.204 When other solutions to 
guard against holdup are not feasible or are too costly, the law could and 
does imply a liability default rule that obligates the promisor to pay for 
the sunk costs of the promisee (his reliance costs) through the legal doc-
trine of promissory estoppel. 
In many successful promissory estoppel cases the parties do not agree 
or map out an investment strategy, so there is no actual agreement be-
forehand about the investment strategy, but one party solicits invest-
ments to learn more about the party. Once those investments are made, 
the investing party is subject to the holdup problem occasioned by se-
quential investment. If the parties proceed to a final deal, but the other 
party waits until later to invest, the investing party will recover one-half 
of the surplus, but less his investment, and the non-investing party will 
recover one-half of the joint surplus and will profit by delay. 
Because the putative promisor stands to benefit through a reduction in 
uncertainty about the promisee from the sunk costs taken by the 
200. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 686. 
201. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 63. 
202. Schwartz & Scott Sltpra note 19 at 683. 
203. !d. , , 
Si 2~4. See Juliet ~· Kostritsky, Reshaping the Precontracwal Liability Debate: Beyo~1d 
1(?1( Run Econ?m.1cs, 58 U. P1n. L. REv. 325, 368-69 (1997) (discussing the costs of m-
tenm payments m mcremental bargaining). 
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counterparty, the sequence of the investment subjects the promisee to the 
risk of hold up, the costs of private solutions negotiated on a case by case 
basis are costly or not feasible,2°5 and the risk is a generalized one affect-
ing many preliminary negotiations. Therefore, the law should and does 
impose a generalized default rule making the soliciting party responsible 
for the transaction-specific costs of the other party.206 The putative prom-
isor benefits from this default rule,2°7 and it is presumably one that he 
would bargain for to induce promisees to invest in ways that reduce un-
certainty for the promisor and encourage trade. 
The risk that parties will act opportunistically, and in doing so discour-
age trade (unless parties can control such hazard at a reasonable cost) can 
occur at different stages of negotiation. It may occur, as Schwartz and 
Scott posit, when parties defect from an agreement to invest simultane-
ously following an initial preliminary agreement on some but not all 
terms. 208 
The risk, however, may also affect pre-contractual reliance that is dis-
tinct from the reliance on a preliminary agreement.209 The results of the 
case law are consistent with a default rule protecting such reliance invest-
ments in both contexts. Courts take account of the uncertainty and hold 
up problems in deciding cases in favor of plaintiffs bringing claims on 
promissory estoppel or other substantive grounds in cases that lack a bar-
gained-for contract. This Article suggests that courts implicitly consider 
the same elements when (1) they determine whether there has been a 
breach of the obligation of good faith in preliminary agreement cases and 
(2) whether to impose liability in the precontractual liability cases. This 
universe of cases thus shares a unifying justificative framework2 l0 useful 
in determining when pre-contractual reliance should be protected. 
In deciding whether and why to impose liability for reliance invest-
ments that do not result in a contract, it is important to consider: (1) the 
timing of the investment; (2) the precise way in which the hold up prob-
lem will manifest itself; (3) the incentive of the parties to undertake effi-
cient investments wilh and without a liability rule; and (4) whether a legal 
intervention is needed to counteract incentives to act in ways that will 
encourage inefficient investments. 
205. See supra notes 192-204. 
206. See supra note 80. 
207. See Kostritsky. supra note 93. at 943 n.202. 
208. Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19. at 686. 
209. For a complete treatment of the available theories available to plaintiffs seeking 
compensation for investments. see Farnsworth. supra note 3 (detailing unjust enrichment. 
promissory statements. fraud. and general obligation as possible theories for precontrac-
tual reliance recovery actions). 
210. See Ronald J. Coffey, lnterventional Implementation, BAI Methodology (unpub-
lished manuscript. on file with author) (exploring fundamental attributes of justificational 
analysis for legal intervention in private agreements); see also Peter M. Gerhart. An Intra· 
duction to Justificational Analysis (Aug. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript. on file with 
author). 
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The problem of moral hazard thus exists outside the distinct factual 
scenario identified by Schwartz and Scott and presents itself at all phases 
of negotiation. It exists whenever one party "has a greater ability than 
the other to delay a material portion of her work. "211 The potential for 
one party to delay investment exists whe!l the promisor is soliciting sunk 
costs from the promisee in order to make determinations about whether 
to proceed and if so, on what terms. Because of the relationship between 
the promisor and the promisee, in which the promisor is gathering infor-
mation to formulate the terms of the offer, the promisee must provide 
information in the form of investment (by reliance and sunk costs) in 
order to enable the putative promisor to proceed to an offer. The prom-
isor has the discretion to delay making any investments of its own and to 
hedge when uncertainties are greatest.212 
Promisors are all genuinely uncertain about qualities of promisees and 
often they will not be able to assess accurately the chances for trade or 
distinguish among possible contracting partners until they receive infor-
lll<ltion from promisees in the form of the reliance investment.213 Promis-
ors who are uncertain about the probability of a trade or about 
contracting partners depend on information to resolve uncertainty. For 
soliciting that benefit, they should be liable for the cost to the investing 
party because it inevitably subjects the other party to hold up vulnerabil-
ity.] 1 ~ What promisees require for investment is a commitment that they 
will be compensated for their reliance investments if promisors encourage 
them to invest;215 otherwise, they will hesitate to invest because of the 
risk of holdup. The liability rule that makes the promisor liable for in-
clucecl reliance provides a law-supplied safeguard. It parallels protection 
the law affords against strategic behavior that occurs when promisors 
promise to invest simultaneously and then delay for private gains in ways 
that reduce the potential surplus. In each case. the risk is that the strate-
gic behavior of one party will deter reliance in the future and discourage 
trades. 
It is the same risk that a party might have faced before the advent of 
constructive conditions of exchange. Without constructive conditions, a 
pmty who had not expressly stipulated that its performance was condi-
tional on the other party's performance could be forced to go forward 
with its own performance, leaving itself vulnerable to the risk that the 
other party would act opportunistically. Mansfield's famous doctrine of 
constructive conditions of exchange-by making each party's duty of per-
formance constructively conditioned on the other party's similar perform-
ance-guaranteed against such risk.21 6 
~11. Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19. at 666 n.11. 
212. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
21.3. See infra cases in note 263. 
214. See Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19. at 683. 
215. ll1is limitation may curb the problems of excessive reliance. 
~16. See Kingston v. Preston. (1773) 99 Eng. Rep. 437, 438 (K.B.). 
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The need for clarifying information exists when the promisor does not 
actually know what the probability of a successful trade is. The promisor 
will solicit investments in order to clarify that probability. Thus, the 
problem is not necessarily one of misrepresenting the facts since the facts 
are not yet known. Rather, it is the inherent structural risk that arises 
whenever the promisor solicits information and the promisee invests, 
leaving the investing party vulnerable to holdup. 
One commentator, Jason Johnston, who has been concerned with the 
same problem of providing solutions to encourage efficient reliance, has 
suggested the solution of protecting pre-trade performance whenever the 
promisor is aware of the performance and has not acted to actively dis-
courage such performance through sending a pessimistic message.217 The 
aim is to discourage overly optimistic messages.218 Johnston's solution 
advocates a rule making promisors liable for pre-trade performance in 
order to flush out those promisors who are actually pessimists (for whom 
the probability of trade is low) but are parading as optimists in the latter 
stages of negotiation following a preliminary agreement in order to en-
courage promisees to invest by beginning to perform, and to encourage 
other parties not part of the preliminary agreement to drop out.219 In 
some ways, until that performance starts, sellers will all look the same;220 
the only way for the sellers to distinguish themselves in a meaningful way 
to buyers is to begin performing.221 Because buyers need such informa-
tion to determine if a deal makes sense, buyers will send encouraging 
messages to all sellers about the possibility of a trade without any factual 
justification for doing so.222 A liability rule would encourage pessimists 
to speak out and to issue a pessimistic statement refle~ting the actual low 
probability of a deaP23 That would make sense because in those cases it 
would be inefficient for promisees to rely because the chances of a trade 
are too low.224 
This Article suggests a default liability rule225 founded on a different 
rationale. It seeks to solve the holdup problem posed by sequential in-
vestment and to control the opportunistic exploitation of such invest-
ments to gain information needed to reduce uncertainty. 
In the early stages the need for information exists since the promisor 
does not know what the probability of a successful trade is and will solicit 
217. Johnston, supra note 15, at 499. 
218. See id. at 494. 
219. Jason Johnston provides this insight. ld. at 494. This will eliminate competitors. 
220. ld. at 494 (explaining that sellers of services that are complex may remain indistin-
guishable to buyers until they actually start performing). 
221. ld. 
222. ld. at 498. 
223. ld. at 495. 
224. ld. at 494. 
225. This suggested liability rule is not new. See Kostritsky, supra note 93. What is new 
is that the author has undertaken a comprehensive search of the recent case law to deter-
mine whether case outcomes comport with the parameters of the liability rule suggested 
here. 
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investments in order to clarify that probability.226 The problem is not 
necessarily one of misrepresenting the facts about the probability of trade 
since the facts are not yet known. Instead, it is the inherent structural 
risk that arises whenever the promisor solicits information and the prom-
isee invests, leaving the promisee vulnerable to holdup, and the non-in-
vesting party is relieved from actually paying anything for the benefits. 
The promisor should be liable for sunk costs that are invested by the 
promisee with no apparent gift motive when solicited by the promisor 
unless the promisor gives notice to the promisee that it will not be re-
sponsible for such costs. Certainly, the promisor could easily add such a 
disclaimer for such sunk costs. Adding such a disclaimer would be no 
more costly than the flip-side equivalent of requiring the promisee to ne-
gotiate for the inclusion of an express clause that imposes liability for 
sunk costs or a general form clause obligating the promisor to refrain 
from acting opportunistically. However, unlike the general form clause 
where the promisee might have trouble detecting whether the promise is 
a credible one, the promise to refuse to cover costs would be credible as 
the promisor would have no incentive to deny liability since it would dis-
courage the promisee from relying. All promisors need promisees to rely 
early on. TI1e liability rule can be rationaliz~d as part of an implicit bar-
gain in which the promisor agrees to pay for investments that are useful 
in resolving whether to go forward and in which the putative promisor 
soliciting sunk costs has a way of making a credible commitment not to 
opportunistically holdup a party who invests. 
This liability rule will address a problem that is likely to arise in all 
cases of solicited sunk costs when it is doubtful that the promisor has yet 
any accurate assessment of the probability of trade. The law imposes lia-
bility, not to force pessimists to disclose their true assessment of the like-
lihood of a trade since such probability is unknown as yet, but because 
such a rule will promote the parties' mutual welfare by encouraging in-
vestment from promisees who would otherwise decline to invest. This 
rationale is not tied to the concealment issue but is grounded in efficiency 
concerns.227 
. 226. Scholars have dealt with the reliance issue occurring in pre-contractual negotia-
t~ons from a number of different vantage points. Some have examined the parties' incen-
tives to make, and the courts' protection of, efficient reliance investments. See Craswell, 
supra note 122. Others have focused on the optimal timing of reliance investments and the 
regulatory role courts should play in protecting promisees who rely when the promisor has 
all of the bargaining power. See Katz, supra note 13, at 1303-04. 
227. Johnston also desired to promote the instrumental end of efficiency. but he aimed 
to do so through a rule that will make pessimists disclose actual low probabilities of trade. 
See Johnston, supra note 15, at 397. 
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VI. THE HIDDEN ELEMENT AND CONNECTING THREAD 
IN RELIANCE CASE LAW IN TWO PHASES OF 
BARGAINING: THE CASE LAW REVISITED 
A liability default rule228 protecting reliance investments made in the 
precontractual period of negotiation and solicited to reduce uncertainty 
for the noninvesting party or to hedge pending the resolution of uncer-
tainty would encourage investment by promisees who would otherwise 
invest sub-optimally.229 The structural problem of hold up that occurs 
when one party invests first in precontractual negotiation would be allevi-
ated. The danger that a promisee would invest and then not be able to 
recoup the investment in the bargain price, since the bargain would ig-
nore sunk costs,23° would be solved. 
Courts have continued to protect such reliance investments in pre-con-
tractual negotiations in cases that resemble the Hoffman v. Red Owl case, 
presenting a fact pattern in which the putative offeror solicits, and the 
promisee makes, non-redeployable reliance investments to help the 
promisor determine whether to proceed further, and if so, on what 
terms. 231 In many of these cases the law protects these investments 
through the application of promissory estoppel case law. 232 In some 
cases, the law also protects such reliance and guards against the holdup 
problem through the creative application of other doctrines, such as 
restitution. 233 
Because many recent scholars have posited the demise of promissory 
estoppel as a viable cause of action,234 and some recent commentators 
228. This Article does not purport to clecicle which amongst several intermediate liabil-
ity rules would be optimaL See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note l7, at 435-41 (discuss-
ing alternative liability regimes). Insteacl, it seeks to (1) demonstrate that there is support 
for imposing liability in at least a subclass of reliance cases that are brought to trial and (2) 
connect the successfLt! reliance cases in precontractual negotiation to the related problem 
of hold up when parties rely orr a preliminary agreement and orre party seeks to delay 
investment. 
229. !d. at .:132. 
230. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666. 
231. Hoffman v. Reel Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2cl 267 (Wis. 1969). 
232. The courts do so without any requirement that there be an ··agreement. .. For a 
contrary view, see Schwartz & Scott suggestirrg that the law denies compensation for such 
investments absent an ··agreement." See Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19. at 668. 
233. See Farnsworth. supra note 3, at 231-33. 
234. Prior analyses o[ the demise of promissory estoppel include several empirical stud-
ies. Sidney W. DeLong. The Ne11· Requirement of Enforcenu!nt Reliance in Connnercwl 
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wts. L. REv. 943, 943; Robert A. Htll-
man. Questioning the "'New Consensus"' on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theo-
retiail Study, 98 CoLuM. L. REv. 580, 588 (1998 ); see also Phuong N. Ph am. Note. The 
Waning of Promissory Estoppel. 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1263. 1263 ( 1994 ). Schwartz and 
Scott continue to question promissory estoppel as a viable cause of action. TI1ey argue that 
the cases provide evidence that courts are unlikely to find liability for reliance costs tn 
cases that involve '"reliance in the absence of any agreement by the parties regarding 
terms." Schwartz & Scott. su1Jra note 19. at 671. Schwartz and Scott culled these cases 
from a larger list that ··exam in[ eel] all public case law data bases for preliminary_ negotia-
tion and preliminary agreement cases proceeding under the following theories of liab!ltty: 
promissory estoppeL quantum meruit, implied contract. indefiniteness. and intent to be 
bound." !d. at 671n.30 (emphasis added). As they explain it. their ··initial'" search ytelclecl 
2008] Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations 1411 
?RO cases. Jd. at 671. They then proceeded to isolate cases involving "reliance in the ab-
~~nce of any agreement by the parti~s ~egarding te:ms" and then found that when the 
court failed to find an agreement, plamtJffs had a failure of rate of 87%. ld. 
TI1eir search may have undercounted cases involving promissory estoppel precontractual 
cases in which parties rely, but without having reached any material terms in any kind of 
reliminary agreement. If, as their article seems to indicate, their search proceeded first ~nder "preliminary negotiation" rather than conducting the initial search under promissory 
estoppel or Section 90, fewer cases might have been identified. It may be that if the search 
looked only at promissory estoppel when it appeared in a case also involving the particular 
search terms "preliminary negotiation,'' the search would undercount the number of reli-
ance cases. This undercounting is consistent with my own study, which yielded 352 cases in 
the same time period as the search conducted by Schwartz and Scott, using the search 
terms ''promissory estoppel" or "Restatement Section 90 w/10 and da (aft 1/1/99 and bf 12/ 
31/03).'' Thus. if one searches for promissory estoppel that appears only in cases in which 
the court also uses the term "preliminary negotiation," some cases that involve reliance 
mav be omitted. If a case did not involve the term "preliminary negotiation," it may have 
been omitted from the Schwartz and Scott database even though it involved a case in 
which a reliance or promissory estoppel claim was alleged and the plaintiff prevailed (ei-
ther on the merits or by surviving a defendant's motion for summary judgment). These 
lists of cases are available on request from the author. 
Perhaps equally important, calculating an 87% failure rate in cases in which the terms 
are not agreed to may not tell us enough to be able to draw a firm conclusion that courts 
require some sort of agreement to be in place for the court to grant reliance damages. 
Certainly it is true that plaintiffs sometimes prevail when they allege a promissory estop-
pel claim as an alternative theory of recovery as a means of overcoming the defendant's 
statute of frauds defense. In such cases, there may be an "agreement" which is not en-
forceable because of a technicality and the plaintiff prevails on a promissory estoppel 
claim. See e.g., Amber Chem. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-06090, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXJS 14451, at *26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (finding that where an alleged oral require-
ments contract is never reduced to writing, a promissory estoppel claim is sufficient to 
withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment). But in other cases the absence 
of a agreement per se may not be an obstacle to recovery. Instead, many of the cases 
involving an absence of agreement also involve a failure of one or more of the key ele-
ments of Section 90, so the failure may be explained by the plaintiff's bringing a case that 
lacks one of the elements of Section 90. This footnote will highlight the facts of various 
cases cited by Schwartz and Scott as evidence that "in the absence of any agreement by the 
parties regarding terms," the plaintiff will be unlikely to prevail. Schwartz & Scott. supra 
note 19. at 671. While the cases may have involved an absence of agreement, one cannot 
necessarily draw the conclusion that to succeed a plaintiff would have to show an agree-
ment. Later in the Article, and also in footnote 263, l highlight the types of cases in which. 
despite the absence of agreement, a plaintiff bringing a reliance claim prevails. I tie the 
success of those cases into a larger analytical framework exploring how uncertainty and 
sequential investment, and the problem of holdup, can influence a court to find in favor of 
a promissory estoppel claimant despite the absence of a traditional bargained-for agree-
ment. Many of the cases that show a low failure rate for reliance claims do not clearly 
support the Schwartz and Scott conclusion that plaintiffs do not prevail on reliance claims 
absent a showing of an agreement. Jd. at 668. Instead, many of the cases cited as failures 
do not reveal that courts require, as a condition of recovery, that the plaintiff demonstrate 
agreement, but rather that plaintiffs will not succeed in a reliance claim if one of the prime 
elements of promissory estoppel is lacking. 
~ecause many of the non-preliminary agreement cases cited by Schwartz and Scott seem 
to mvolve weak cases in which one or more elements of a Section 90 cause of action is 
lacking, they do not reveal whether the court would have denied a claimant's cause of 
action if it had met all of the elements of Section 90 but failed to prove agreement. If 
?chwartz and Scott had been able to cite such cases, then their conclusion for courts requir-
mg agreement as a "necessary condition to a promisee's recovery" would have been 
str.?nger. I d. at 668. For example, Abt Associates, Inc. v. JHPIEGO Corp .. 104 F. Supp. 2cl 
52.J (D. Mel. 2000), a case cited by Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31, is a weak 
case not because it lacks a traditional agreement, but because the plaintiff cannot demon-
strate any detriment. In Abt Associates, the plaintiff had no reliance damages because all 
of the pre-breakdown costs were covered and paid by the defendant. Since the promise 
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that was made to cover pre-agreement expenses was fulfilled, promissory estoppel, which 
grants recovery for broken promises, was not available. I d. at 533. The Abt Associates case 
seems to be a particularly weak one since the court found no "demonstrable detriment"; 
there was an initial presubcontract "which was fully performed"; and this was not a case in 
which the plaintiff took steps and incurred expenditures that benefited the defendant and 
for which th~ plaintiff would not be compensated if the court failed to find liability under 
promissory estoppel, since the pre-subcontract provided compensation to the plaintiff. Jd. 
at 536, 531. Thus, Abr Associates and other cases cited as evidence of the high failure rate 
of reliance claims in the absence of agreement or deceit instead stand for evidence that 
promissory estoppel will not succeed when one of the major elements of the claim is ab-
sent. See also Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guiness Bass Import Co., 290 F.3d 877, 879 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (cited by Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31) (finding that a statement 
by beer company that plaintiff was the "leading candidate," and a question by the defen-
dant inquiring whether plaintiff "would be willing to pay 2 to 9 times earnings ... to gain 
an exclusive" right did not constitute an actionable promise so promissory estoppel cause 
of action would not lie); Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, S.A. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 
03 Civ. 1537, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23062, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003) (cited bv 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31) (finding that where letter of intent contained 
an express denial of any motivating factors for the purchase of notes other than those 
included in the express materials and such signed materials, including the offering memo-
randa, contained express disclaimers of any reliance on defendant's representations, plain-
tiff's reliance was unreasonable); Fimon v. Kenroc Drywall Supplies, Inc., No. C7-02-1588, 
2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 311, at "'1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2003) (ruling against plaintiffs 
on a promissory estoppel claim for a 5% ownership interest when the plaintiffs "testified in 
depositions that they did not remember or recall any specific details of their conversation 
with the [defendant] corporation's president about their ownership interest," cited no spe-
cific promises-thereby making reliance unreasonable, took no risks in the start up, and 
were paid in the form of bonuses). Cases that are lacking one of the elements such as the 
three cases cited here (promise, harm, etc.) do not support the proposition that absent 
agreement, a court will not find promissory estoppel. Even absent agreemem in the midst 
of preliminary negotiations, parties can prevail on a promissory estoppel claim if the other 
elements are met. See infra cases cited in note 263. 
To prove the claim that absent agreement or deceit, plaintiffs cannot prevail on a prom-
issory estoppel claim. Schwartz and Scott would need to find cases in which the plaintiffs 
can show all of the elements of promissory estoppel (including promise, reasonable reli-
ance, and foreseeability of reliance) and yet the plaintiffs lose their claims without a show-
ing that there is an "agreement" or deceit. When plaintiffs lose a claim, as in Beer Capi!Of, 
because there is no promise, or only a weak promise, there is no indication in the holding 
itself that in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, the plaintiffs must demon-
strate that an agreement exists. See Beer Capitol, 290 F.3d at 880. 
Alternatively, to demonstrate the proposition that, absent an agreement, plaintiffs can-
not prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, Schwartz and Scott could point to case out-
comes in which the plaintiff met all of the elements of a promissory estoppel claim but lost 
nonetheless because there was "no agreement." See Jody Kraus, The Methodological Com-
mitments of Contemporary Contract Law, 12-15 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 01-2, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id= 
269975 (discussing efficiency theorists' interest in rationalizing case outcomes). Schwartz 
and Scott could rest their conclusion on actual language in a case denying recovery in cases 
where the elements were met but the plaintiff nonetheless lost because a court explicitly 
articulated that the plaintiff's loss was due to the failure to prove "an agreement." How-
ever, the cases that Schwartz and Scott cite in their article do not fall into either category. 
Courts do not appear to require "agreement" as a pre-condition to recovery either in the 
articulated holding, nor is the requirement of an agreement reflected in the outcomes of 
cases. Without identifying a pattern of cases in which plaintiffs bring strong claims with a 
definite promise, foreseeable and jusitifiable reliance, and detriment (loss), but then lose 
because the courts seem to require, either explicitly or implicitly, the showing of an a&r~e­
ment, it is hard to understand the support for their thesis that agreement is a precond1t10n 
to recovery in precontractual negotiation cases. Cases like Beer Capitol involve the ab-
sence of a promise, and, of course, without a promise to begin with there can be no agree-
ment. However, the presence of recovery in cases where the elements are met but there 15 
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have argued that "[c]ourts actually make some form of agreement a nec-
essary condition to a promisee's recovery,"235 this Article re-examines 
recent case law236 to see if the results support the view that courts allow 
claimants to recover for reliance only if the court finds "agreement" or if 
the defendant breached a promise to invest simultaneously-the template 
of liability envisioned by Schwartz and Scott.237 This Article identifies a 
subset of cases where promissory estoppel is likely to succeed in precon-
tractual negotiation despite the absence of an agreement or a promise to 
invest simultaneously. It offers a rationale for the success in such cases 
that is based on the parties' hypothetical consent to prevent a sequential 
investment holdup problem that would otherwise occur. If a subset of 
precontractual negotiation cases presenting the sequential investment/ 
holdup problem is isolated analytically from the "preliminary agreement" 
cases,:23S then it appears that promissory estoppel protects reliance, with-
out regard to whether a court finds that an agreement exists or whether 
there is an agreement to invest simultaneously.239 
no agreement. discussed in infra note 263, suggest that agreement is not a sine qua non of a 
promissory estoppel recovery. 
235. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 668. 
236. The cases that I looked at came from a list of cases identified by Lexis and Westlaw 
searches for the period 1999-2007. The search terms included Restatement 90 and promis-
sory estoppel. I read cases identified by my research assistants as relevant and meeting the 
criteria I had outlined. I also Shephardized important cases such as Hoffman v. Red Owl 
Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1969) and Esquire Radio & Electronics, Inc. v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986) to identify other cases to read. I also read 
cases identified and discussed in the text or the footnotes by Schwartz and Scott in their 
article. as important paradigm cases in their theory of when- reliance claims succeeded in 
cases involving preliminary agreements. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19. 
237. See id. at 666-67. 
238. Preliminary agreement cases tend to concern letter of intent cases where "parties 
often reach substantial agreement before they make reliance investments." /d. at 693. In 
contrast, this Article focuses on reliance investments made at a prior stage, where uncer-
tainty is greater, thereby precluding any preliminary agreement. The fact patterns in 
Schwartz and Scott's article often arise in cases that courts treat under the doctrinal label 
of "preliminary agreement" cases. ld. at 694. The courts are trying to ascertain whether 
th~ parties have reached an agreement that the parties intended to be binding despite the 
failure to agree on certain terms. If that intent can be found, the parties are not then 
seeking reliance investments to resolve remaining uncertainty since they have indicated 
as~ent and a willingness to go forward without resolving uncertainty. T11e remaining negoti-
atiOns often concern how the surplus will be split. 
239. It is not completely clear what Schwartz and Scott mean by "agreement" in this 
context. Th~y could be referring to a full fledged explicitly reciprocal contract, though in 
suc_h a case 1 t would be difficult to see why the plaintiff was bringing a promissory estoppel 
claim except in cases involving a failure to meet an applicable statute of frauds require-
ment. Al~ernatively, they could be referring to the presence of an agreement that fell short 
of the ultimate agreement but did reach consensus on some terms. Again, it is difficult to 
know w_hy these cases would be relevant to precontractual negotiation cases, which seem to 
evolve In the absence of any preliminary agreement. The broad claim by Schwartz and 
Scott that reliance claims rarely succeed absent an agreement does not seem to be sup-
ported _by the case law. Instead, the cases cited tend to demonstrate that promissory estop-
pel cl_aim_s tend to fail when one of the elements of promissory estoppel is weak. If the 
promise IS weak or unreliable, the reliance claim will fail. See, e.g., Beer Capitol Distrib., I~c:, ~- Gumess B~ss Import Co., 290 F.3d 877, 879-80 (2002) (finding that statement that 
P amt1ff was "leadmg candidate" for a distributorship was not actionable promise). 
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Success is also unlikely if the agreement specifically indicates that reliance expenditures 
in the precontractual period will not be compensated (a type of disclaimer) or that the 
agreement is not legally binding or if there is an absolute right to terminate. See, e.g., 
Universal Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 95 CIV. 8436. 1999 
WL 771357, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1999). These results make sense if one wants to 
discourage unreasonable reliance by promisees who have been alerted that the agreement 
has no binding effect. 
The plaintiff is also going to lose on a promissory estoppel claim when the court finds the 
reliance to be unreasonable and there is no evidence that the defendant, in order to hedge 
or reduce its own uncertainty, solicited reliance investments by the plaintiff. For example. 
see Indus. Maxifreight Servs., LLC v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 
630, 636 (W.D. Mich. 2002), where the court found reliance by lessor on lessee's promise to 
lease was unreasonable in light of unrebutted evidence of repeated statements by lessee 
that home office approval was needed for the lease. Schwartz and Scott cited Maxifreight 
as evidence of case data that "show that, absent misrepresentation or deceit, there gener-
ally is no liability for inducing reliance investments." Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19, at 
672. Maxifreiglu really concerned a case in which the plaintiff's alleged reliance took place 
largely "prior to the initial lease discussions." Maxifreight, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 636. The 
case therefore does not present the Hoffman paradigm, in which the defendant induces the 
plaintiff to take reliance steps that benefit the defendant by allowing it to hedge pending 
the resolution of uncertainty, or actually diminish uncertainty about the plaintiff by shed-
ding light on the plaintiff's characteristics. Thus, the case is not a compelling case for the 
application of a liability default rule since it does not present the same risk of hold up. 
Schwartz and Scott cited Galaxy Networks, Inc. v. Kenan System Corp., Nos. 97-56386, 
97-56435, 2000 WL 714554 (9th Cir. June 2, 2000), as a case that '"granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of contract claims." Schwartz & 
Scott, supra note 19. at 672 n.31. 
Yet the Galaxy case is not a case that fits the paradigm of precontractual negotiations in 
the Hoffman paradigm/mode and indicates very little about whether and under what cir-
cumstances a plaintiff could prevail in early negotiation. Galaxy was clearly a case in which 
the parties were negotiating piecemeal and had reached agreement on some but not all 
terms, but clearly intended to reach a fully enforceable future agreement that did agree to 
all material terms. Galaxy, 2000 WL 714554. at *2. Because Schwartz and Scott treated 
the case as one in which "there is no legal obligation until such future agreement is made." 
it really says very little about how a court would approacl1 the question of liability when 
parties were not at the point where they were able to agree on certain terms but reserve 
agreement on others for the future. !d. (citation omitted). Cases like Hoffman, which 
involve parties who are making promises and assurances on which others rely in order to 
reduce uncertainty for the promisor, are very different from a case like Galaxy. When 
parties are striving to reach a fully enforceable complete agreement in the future but reach 
agreement on such matters early on, there is always the question of whether they intend 
the agreement on some terms to be enforceable as stand alone clauses or whether those 
terms are not enforceable until a binding complete agreement is reached. In such negotia-
tions, there is always a risk that a party who got the counterparty to agree to some terms 
would then try to enforce those terms without regard to whether the parties ever reached 
an agreement on the remaining terms. Enforceability of the individual clauses can bmd a 
party to a term that they would never have agreed to unless other pieces of the agreement 
were forthcoming. See PIT Robertson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. 420 F.3d 728. 
731-32 (7th Cir. :005) (opinion by Easterbrook, J.) (cited in Schwartz and Scott, supra note 
19, at 664 for a discussion of this risk). 
The plaintiff in Galaxy never brought a claim for a reliance cause of action and the court 
never addressed whether a reliance or Section 90 cause of action would lie. Thus, an ad-
verse judgment for the plaintiff on a breach of contract action says little about what result a 
court might reach in a case involving no agreement on interim terms, but rather .a case 
from an earlier stage of negotiations involving a possible hold up due to sequenttal mvest-
ment. Therefore, the plaintiff's loss in a claim involving preliminary negotiations that re-
sulted in agreement on some terms, but which were negotiated and agreed to with the 
expectation that a final agreement would resolve other issues in comprehensive way. does 
not shed light on how a court would decide a case that involved promises and reliance but 
not a claim by to enforce separately agreed on material terms, absent the more complete 
agreement without which the interim agreement might not make sense. 
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TI1e difficulty with some of the cases cited by Schwartz and Scott to 
support the proposition that "courts actually make some form of agree-
ment a necessary condition to a promisee's recovery"240 is that the cases 
do not support the proposition if broadly interpreted. Instead, the pro-
position seems to be accurate i~ one f~c~ses only on. a .subset of cases. in 
which the parties are engaged m prehmmary negotiatiOns whose maJor 
efforts were directed at reaching a final written contract, and one party 
attempted to recover on the basis of an interim agreement when there 
was no final contract embodying agreement on all of the terms. If the 
case does not have a fact pattern involving preliminary agreement on 
some points with final agreement postponed on others because the par-
ties understand that they would not be bound until the final, complete 
agreement, then a court is free to reach a different result (i.e., liability). 
In such cases, courts do not seem to require that a promisee in a reliance 
cause of action under Section 90 establish an "agreement" as a precondi-
tion to recovery. 
PFT Roberson Inc. v. Volvo Trucks is a case of the first kind-the par-
ties were negotiating toward a final agreement-and the court denied re-
covery to the plaintiff who tried to argue that certain interim emails were 
binding.241 In PFT Robertson, an operator of long-haul trucks that de-
rived its trucks and maintenance from Freightliner began negotiations 
with Volvo when its initial fleet agreement with Freightliner was termi-
nated.242 TI1ose negotiations consisted partly of emails signifying agree-
ment on some individual issues, though no comprehensive final 
agreement was ever reached or signed by the parties.243 TI1e truck opera-
tor later argued that the emails at least raised a jury question as to 
"whether there [was] a contract" on each of the individually agreed to 
terms. 24 .J 
Judge Easterbrook found that because it was clear that the parties were 
negotiating toward a final "global"245 agreement, their emails reciting 
agreement on some individual terms did not demonstrate an intention by 
H expense~; are not transaction specific, do not involve significant expense, can be 
redeployed. or are merely preparatory, or if some other element required for a successful 
reliance claim on promissory estoppel is absent from the facts, success is also unlikely . 
. The failure to succeed in the cases cited by Schwartz and Scott indicates that the plain-
~Jf!s brought weak claims. In some cases the plaintiffs brought a claim in which the prom-
ISe wns ambiguous or really not a promise at all, and it was not clear why the plaintiffs 
brought the case. In other cases the plaintiffs brought claims that might be justified by the 
actual language of Section 90, but the claims failed because case law has grafted on addi-
tiOnal nuance as to how the elements are interpreted. Courts may require the reliance 
taken to constitute sunk costs that are not redeployable or they may require the reliance to 
have advan~ed beyond the merely preparatory investigation that each side normally takes 
at Its 0\~n :1sk. Losses in cases that do not meet the elements required of reliance claims 
do not md1cate that reliance claims are no longer winnable. 
240. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 668. 
241. 420 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2005). 
242. !d. 
243. !d. at 728. 
244. !d. at 732. 
245. !d. at 730. 
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the parties to create binding and enforceable agreements on such individ-
ual terms in advance of a com.prehensive agreement.246 Summary judg-
ment was therefore appropriate.247 
But citing a case like PFT Roberson to support a propos1t1on, as 
Schwartz and Scott have,248 that preliminary negotiations in which the 
parties ''have discussed a deal but have not agreed to one"249 will deny 
the disappointed party all recovery, proves too much on the one hand, 
and on the other hand reveals very little about when parties engaged in 
preliminary negotiations, even absent agreement, will succeed. When 
parties reach agreement on a series of issues in stages250 but always in-
tend that there will be a final binding comprehensive agreement, allowing 
a party to insist that the individually negotiated separate points of agree-
ment were enforceable as a contract would, as Judge Easterbrook ex-
plains, be equivalent to 
[l]etting one side accept the favorable terms without the compensa-
tory ones [and] would be like permitting the buyer to say: 'We have 
agreed on quantity but not price; I now accept the quantity term and 
am entitled to the goods at whatever price a jury thinks reasonable.' 
Firms do not ... put themselves at the mercy of their counterparts in 
that way.251 
Judge Easterbrook found no liability on the individually-created points 
of interim agreements when the parties were negotiating toward a final 
contract and made their agreement subject to further resolution at the 
stage of the final agreement. TI1is says very little about how courts should 
or do decide cases in which the parties are engaged in preliminary negoti-
ations but have not discussed the details of a deal and their efforts are not 
done in the shadow of, or subject to, a looming final negotiated agree-
ment, but rather involve preliminary promises and reliance. Schwartz 
and Scott's statement that when parties "have discussed a deal but have 
not agreed to one" they are denied recovery252 should be read very nar-
rowly to apply only to cases where the parties are negotiating on a series 
of points towards a final wl'itten agreement and then one party seeks to 
impose contract liability on the other party on the basis of individually 
agreed to points, even though it was clear that there was to be no liability 
absent a comprehensive agreement. This Article posits that the state-
ment by Schwartz and Scott proves too much when it suggests that the 
absence of agreement would mean no liability.253 In actuality, it is not 
really the absence of agreement that defeats recovery so much as it is the 
fact that when it is clear to everyone that there was to be no contract 
246. !d. at 731-32. 
247. !d. 
248. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664 n.4. 
249. !d. at 664. 
250. PFT Robertson, 420 F.3d at 731. 
251. !d. at 732. 
252. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664. 
253. !d. 
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liability without a comprehensive agreement, a plaintiff will not succeed 
absent such agreement. 
Thus, the suggestion that there will be no liability "'absent agreement" 
is far too broad a statement to address whether there is or should be 
liability in precontractual negotiations when the parties have not even 
be2.un to negotiate individual points that may make up the final agree-
m~1t, or to zero in on such terms with the understanding that liability will 
await a comprehensive agreement. Rather, the fact pattern involves reli-
ance on promises made early on in these contexts. Here, Schwartz and 
Scott are willing to admit that there might be liability, although their 
overall thesis is that agreement is a precondition for recovery in prelimi-
nary negotiation cases.254 In fact, Schwartz and Scott admit that there 
may be liability for induced reliance if a misrepresentation or promise is 
present.255 If so, and liability exists on the basis of induced reliance on 
promises, and those cases do not involve an agreement, then the state-
ment that courts will not find liability for preliminary negotiations absent 
agreement is too broad. Perhaps courts will not find liability absent an 
agreement when the preliminary negotiations are all conducted in the 
shadow of and directed toward a final agreement, and there is evidence 
that the parties did not intend any interim preliminary agreement to be 
binding absent a final complete agreement. If that more narrow interpre-
tation is accepted, then the following question still remains an open one: 
what results do courts reach in preliminary negotiations, in Hoffman-type 
cases, and why are those outcomes justifiable? 
Without a liability rule (imposed through promissory estoppel) or an 
explicit side agreement/payment to prevent opportunistic exploitation of 
sunk costs, promisees will underinvest and the promisor's ability to re-
duce uncertainty in preliminary negotiation would be diminished. Be-
cause the default rule can be rationalized as part of an implicit 
contract,256 it would make sense that precontractual reliance claims have 
less traction and success in cases in which parties are operating on the 
basis of letters of intent or exchanged drafts and have an express or im-
plied desire to postpone enforceability until a forthcoming formal con-
tract is achieved. The presence of letters of intent or exchanged drafts, 
particularly in cases where the court finds no intent to have an enforcea-
ble agreement absent a more complete formal agreement, would render 
reliance on such preliminary agreements unjustified or unreasonable and, 
therefore, non-compensable. 
Nevertheless, in some preliminary agreement cases, at least those in 
which courts find that the presence of a binding agreement imposes an 
?bligation to bargain in good faith and to compensate a party who has 
mvested when the other party has breached its obligation to invest at the 
254. ld. 
255. ld. at 664 n.4. 
K 
256_. For a discussion of implicit contracting and the literature on that topic, see Juliet P. 
ostntsky, supra note 93, at 905 n.28. 
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same time, the court's goal in finding bad faith is to prevent opportunistic 
behavior. The law provides a safeguard through a liability rule as a way 
of protecting against one form of strategic behavior that occurs after a 
preliminary agreement is entered into and a joint plan of simultaneous 
investment is agreed to but then breached by one party who defers 
investment. 
The emerging case law on breaches of promises to invest simultane-
ously made at the same time or after a binding preliminary agreement has 
led Schwartz and Scott to argue that lawyers should turn their misplaced 
attention away from precontractual preliminary negotiation Hoffman-
type cases. The focus should instead be on the preliminary agreements 
that are accompanied by a promise to invest simultaneously. This goal is 
the same one that animates the imposition of a liability rule to go\ern 
early precontractual negotiations to prevent hold up by compensating a 
promisee whose sunk costs have been solicited to reduce promisor uncer-
tainty. In both instances courts have demonstrated a willingness to pro-
tect reliance investments to prevent hold up. 
Nevertheless, commentators have argued against the expansion of 
promissory estoppel. They have advanced several arguments about prom-
issory estoppel claims: that they rarely succeed in the case law,257 that 
liability has gone too far, 258 that the current doctrinal scheme is too un-
certain,259 that promissory liability will chill negotiation,260 or that there 
is only a "myth of pre-contractual reliance."261 
Contrary to the belief of recent scholars who argue that judicial protec-
tion of precontractual reliance investments absent an agreement is merely 
a "myth, "262 courts routinely protect transaction-specific precontractual 
reliance investments when they are solicited by promisors in cases where 
the investments in precontractual negotiations by the promisee will leave 
it vulnerable to hold up by the other party. Promissory estoppel does and 
should play an important role in these contexts. 
The criticisms of promissory estoppel-including the idea that it has 
been a colossal failure in the cases-have gained traction in part because 
all types of promissory estoppel reliance cases have been lumped to-
gether. Reliance cases in which one or more of the doctrinal elements is 
lacking have been lumped together with cases involving preliminary 
agreements in which the parties may have intended no contractual liabil-
ity until the final complete contract and reliance cases in which the plain-
tiff presents a strong or plausible case. At the same time, reliance cases 
257. Hillman, supra note 234, at 580, 588-89. 
258. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 669-70. 
259. ld. at 663. 
260. Johnston, supra note 15, at 493. 
261. Robert E. Scott. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reli-
ance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007). 
262. See id. Certainly cases do exist in which there are agreements and reliance. Often 
these involve contracts that are not enforceable under the statute of frauds. where the 
court chooses to protect the promisee's reliance. 
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have been artificially segregated by recent authors into two separate cate-
aories: those involving reliance in precontractual negotiations, and those 
involving reliance following a binding preliminary agreement reached af-
ter an agreement to invest simultaneously and one party defects. There 
has been little understanding of how the cases may be linked conceptually 
through the analytical link of preventing hold up. Thus, when commenta-
tors link all promissory estoppel/reliance cases involving precontractual 
preliminary negotiations into one category and fail to separate out de-
monstrably weak cases from that set, the reader gains a distorted view of 
whether and when a reliance claim will succeed. It would be helpful in-
stead if scholars focused on when reliance claims succeed and why. This 
Article argues that where one party, deciding whether to proceed with a 
transaction, seeks to reduce uncertainty for itself or to hedge in the nego-
tiation process by soliciting sunk cost investments from the other party, 
promissory estoppel is and should be particularly likely to succeed263 if 
263. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732-735 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that plaintiff 
proved reliance sufficient to support jury's award of damages for promissory estoppel 
where plaintiff promised to make a $100,000 loan and provided significant legal advice. and 
defendant faced many uncertainties, including: whether or not the restaurant would suc-
ceed or fail; whether defendant could secure a bank loan; and what type of legal services 
would be needed; and where defendant benefited greatly because (1) it was able to secure 
whatever legal services were needed; (2) had a commitment to receive $100,000 in the 
event that it did not receive a bank loan; and (3) the pledge of a $100,000 Joan from plain-
tiff possibly helped defendant obtain the bank financing); Esquire ·Radio & Elecs., Inc. v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co .. 804 F.2d 787, 791-795 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that a promissory 
estoppel claim was properly submitted to a jury where defendant, uncertain of whether 
plaintiff would provide spare parts for competitors and arguably uncertain of the quantity 
of spare parts it would need, assured plaintiff that it would purchase the spare parts that 
plaintiff imported and stored. and in reliance upon that, plaintiff phased out its work with 
other competitors and allowed its spare parts inventories to accumulate over the course of 
a twenty-year, informal buy-back arrangement); Amber Chem. Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 
No.1 :06-CV-06090, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *16-26 (.E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (find-
ing that where a defendant's promise to plaintiff to supply a product for a year if plaintiff 
purchased as much as in the prior year allowed defendant to hedge; if the sale to a third 
party of that part of the business did not work out, defendant had guaranteed sales to 
plaintiff, and if the sale went through, defendant could insulate itself from liability by 
pleading absence of a contract; promissory estoppel claim withstood defendant's motion 
for summary judgment); Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 415 F. Supp. 2d 423, 456-
~59 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that a claim of promissory estoppel could survive summary 
.Judgment where plaintiff, in reliance on expectation of defendants' three to five million-
dollar investment, filed a restated certificate of incorporation as directed by defendant, 
convinced its shareholders to subordinate their class of shares to defendants,' convinced its 
original investors to reduce or forego dividends and invest more money, advised other 
mvestors that plaintiff had accepted defendant's offer and that more investments were to 
foilow. and made a bridge Joan for $100,000 and defendant was also uncertain that plaintiff 
could run the company); Cin-Doo, Inc. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. Civ. 04-CV-50-SM, 2005 WL 
768592, at *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2005) (finding plaintiffs request for injunctive relief based 
on promissory estoppel could survive summary judgment where defendant, uncertain 
about futu~e of 7-Eieven store and about plaintiff franchisee's willingness to support a 
reconstructiOn, assured plaintiff that a complete reconstruction of the store would happen 
and that II would be beneficial; and plaintiff, in reliance, did not object to a transfer of real 
esta_te fro~ the 7-Eleven to a neighboring Home Depot and sold another 7-Eleven in antic-
IpatiOn of mcreased profits from the reconstructed store); Carey v. FedEx Ground Package 
Sys. Inc .. 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 922-24 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that where plaintiff wanted 
a delivery contract with a shipping company and was given repeated assurances that a 
route would be available, plaintiff relied by purchasing a van and took other steps such as 
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finding back up drivers, and plaintiffs steps permitted defendant to hedge during an initial 
period of uncertainty while deciding on which driver would be best for the available routes, 
plaintiff withstood defendant's motion for summary judgment by prevailing on a claim of 
promissory estoppel); Nutrition Mgmt. v. Harborside Healthcare Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-
CV-0902, 2004 WL 764809, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2004) (finding plaintiff's claim for 
promissory estoppel survives summary judgment where defendant induced plaintiff to con-
tinue to provide food operation services for its healthcare facilities based on assurance of 
long term relationship. and plaintiff relied on this by continuing to provide food services 
even though there was dispute over payments and plaintiff was operating at a loss); Robin-
son v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107-09 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that plaintiff's 
promissory estoppel claim withstood summary judgment when defendant hires plaintiff 
despite uncertainty about her transactional skills and promised to train her in needed skills; 
plaintiff's reliance allowed defendant to hedge while it determined if others are available 
to do transactional work); Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1283-86 
(Ala. 1985) (denying summary _judgment to the defendant in a promissory estoppel action 
where defendant made promises that induced action by the plaintiff and that also allowed 
defendant to postpone any contract until uncertainty about whether the plaintiff could 
finish the construction of apartments to accommodate plaintiff's airline crews); Schade v. 
Dietrich, No. 1 CA-CIV. 8478, 1987 Ariz. App. LEXIS 667, at *3-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 
15, 1987) (finding that where plaintiff asked to resign but defendant wanted plaintiff to 
continue working on a project and defendant offered "appropriate" but still uncertain sev-
erance benefits and defendant benefited from plaintiff's work while details of severance 
worked out, plaintiff's reliance on the promised severance package entitled plaintiff to 
recover under Section 90); Sprouts for Better Living, LLC v. Lake Hills Shopping Ctr., No. 
CV040408837S, 2005 WL 2008871, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2005) (finding claim for 
promissory estoppel could withstand summary judgment where defendant, a shopping 
center uncertain that it could accommodate a Trader Joe's, induced plaintiff to relinquish 
half of its space prior to the expiration of the lease); Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings, 
Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1033 (Del. 2003) (finding that where defendant was unsure of how 
expansion plans for selling more Lamborghinis would develop and offered assurances to 
plaintiff that continued exclusivity in selling rights would depend on plaintiff's demonstrat-
ing capacity for expansion and plaintiff relied on promises by making significant invest-
ments in "operational capacity," court affirmed jury verdict for promissory estoppel as 
plaintiff's investments permitted the defendant to hedge by having plaintiff ready for in-
creased sales if the expansion plans went through); Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ. A. 1592-N, 
2006 WL 905347, at *14-19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006) (finding plaintiff was entitled to reliance 
damages for claim of promissory estoppel where he put out flyers and made plans for a 
swim camp at a pool that be intended to lease from or buy with defendant. and where 
defendant was uncertain that he could get zoning approval for the project, frequently rep-
resented to the media and city officials that the plaintiff would be involved in the project, 
and plaintiff's good reputation helped defendant obtain zoning approval and buy the build-
ing); Christiana Marine Serv. Corp. v. Texaco Fuel & Marine Mktg. Inc., No. 98C-02-
217WCC, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2004) (finding that where 
defendant wanted plaintiff to act as defendant's exclusive provider of bunker transporta-
tion and wanted assurance that plaintiff could meet defendant's needs for transportation. 
and defendant assured plaintiff that it planned to put through 200,000 barrels of oil 
monthly but remained uncertain about what its equipment needs would be, plaintiffs reli-
ance allowed defendant to hedge and to benefit from having an entire line of barges wait-
ing for them. and defendant did not need to pay, and fees and secured reduced rate 
promissory estoppel judgment affirmed); Kirkpatrick v. Seneca Nat'! Bank, 515 P.2d 781, 
785-88 (Kan. 1973) (finding that where defendant bank lacks information about whether to 
shut down a line of credit for a customer/debtor and defendant solicited accounting ser-
vices from plaintiff to clarify financial situation of customer and promises payment, prom-
issory estoppel justified judgment for plaintiff; plaintiff's services permitted defendant to 
hedge pending resolution of uncertainty about the finances of the debtor): Dickson v. 
Comair, Inc., No. 2001-CA-002354-MR, 2003 WL 21471979, at *1. 7 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27, 
2003) (finding that summary judgment was granted against plaintiff in error where defen-
dant, an airline carrier unsure of the commitment of its supervisors, assured plaintiff that if 
she relinquished her twelve years of seniority to become a supervisor that the seniority 
could be reinstated if her job were ever effectively eliminated); Jackson v. Morse. 871 A.2d 
47, 49-53 (N.H. 2005). aff'g in part, vacati11g in part, No. Civ. 03-264-JD, 2003 WL 21735448 
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the other elements are present, including a definite promise, justifiable 
reliance, and demonstrable detriment. 
TI1is section will look at cases involving preliminary agreements and 
precontractual reliance to see how these cases are resolved. It will also 
consider the cases involving promises to invest simultaneously when 
those promises are made in connection with a binding preliminary agree-
ment-the cases discussed by Schwartz and Scott. The thread that con-
nects protection for reliance investments at these different stages of the 
contracting process is the prevention of opportunism and holdup. It can 
occur when one party who has entered into a preliminary agreement 
chooses to delay investment for strategic reasons, thereby leaving the in-
vesting party vulnerable to holdup. Holdup can also occur at the begin-
ning of the negotiating process where no preliminary agreement exists 
because the uncertainties are too great and one party invests at the other 
party's request, leaving the investing party unable to recoup all those 
costs as the requesting party captures part of them in the surplus. 
The success of claimants in both types of cases can be rationalized as a 
means of improving welfare. Without a liability rule, underinvestment ex 
ante is likely to occur because the investing party fears the expropriation 
of its sunk costs and hold up. The problem of sequential investment 
where one party, the putative promisor, delays its own investment while 
securing sunk costs invested by the promisee, suggests that a liability de-
fault rule should govern these cases.264 It would mitigate the potential 
for lost trades and underinvestment that inevitably accompany a sequen-
tial investment sequence where the promisor has the ability to defer any 
investment until it can be fully recouped in a bargain. T11e very same 
danger of lost trading opportunities is presented by the scenario in which 
(D.N.H. July 28, 2003) (finding plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to expectation dam-
ages on their claim of promissory estoppel where defendant, uncertain of whether plaintiffs 
would choose to invest their funds with him, promised to make up the shortfall if value of 
mvestment account was below $62,000 dollars so long as plaintiffs agreed to give him total 
control of the account, and plaintiffs relied on this promise by giving him total control of 
the account); Taylor Box Co. v. SAR Group Ltd., No. CA 2002-1033, 2005 WL 705991, at 
*4-7 (R.I. Super. Mar. 25, 2005) (finding defendant liable, based on promissory estoppel, 
for expenses incurred by plaintiff manufacturer even though no agreement or contract 
where defendant, uncertain of whether it could find a manufacturer for a DVD box that 
was a "~etter value" than its current box, told plaintiff that it would order 2,000 boxes, and 
~~-ongomg conversations led plaintiff to believe there was a deal). See also infra notes 309-
0lder cases that fit this pattern of allowing recovery when a defendant solicits actions 
that ar~ valuable to the defendant in allowing it to hedge (and postpone a commitment on 
the ultJrnat~ project) until a later point in time include: Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 
45~ (7th C!r. 1986) (discussing defendant's promise, which induced plaintiffs to release 
cla~m for legal fees and allowed defendant to hedge on any commitment to the plaintiff 
~hlle the defendant secured valuable information and removed an obstacle to a transac-
tion with a third party); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A2d 123 (DeL 1958) (finding that 
defendant's assurances secured cooperation of plaintiff and allowed defendant to identify 
the ;hareholders of a dealership). See also cases cited in Kostritsky, supra note 93, at 943 
n.20 __ 
2?4. See Smir_ov & Wait, supra note 144, at 399 (suggesting that "[t]he disadvantage of 
stagmg [sequencmg of investment] is that it reduces the payoff of the first mover"). 
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two parties enter into an agreement to invest simultaneously and one 
party breaches the agreement because it would be more privately benefi-
cial to do so (the paradigm problem identified by Schwartz and Scott). 
The danger is one of opportunism, although it takes a slightly different 
form in which the party who promised to invest simultaneously decides to 
delay, whereas in the preliminary precontractual negotiation setting, the 
danger is that the promisor will solicit and use information without ever 
paying anything for it. In each of these two cases, one party would like to 
be able to offer assurances to the counterparty to encourage the 
counterparty to continue to invest, without which the counterparty would 
be reluctant to invest, especially when the investments are transaction 
specific. Promises may lack credibility; there is no way to know how reli-
able or trustworthy the promisor is, nor to know ahead of time what 
events will affect the person making a promise, such as one to invest si-
multaneously, and make it unprofitable to keep the promise.265 In the 
preliminary negotiation context, the investing party can only make esti-
mates of probabilities regarding the opportunistic proclivities of the other 
party. Moreover, the investing party may assume that a promise to com-
pensate for verifiable reliance expenses would be part of their implicit 
bargain, since without that protection the promisee would be wary of in-
vesting at all, and that result would not maximize gains from trade. 
The identification of a core subset of successful cases in each cate-
gory-both precontractual Hoffman-type paradigm cases and preliminary 
agreement cases involving promises to invest simultaneously, together 
with the costs of alternative solutions to the investment problem, may 
help to explain why and when promissory estoppel and reliance claims 
should succeed: namely when the particular danger presented by sequen-
tial investment is present. 
Instead of trying to draw connections, Schwartz and Scott have sepa-
rated these types of precontractual and preliminary agreement cases. 
They argue that merely because both preliminary agreement cases (in-
volving letters of intent) and precontractualliability cases (the Hoffman-
type case) involve reliance and lack a heterodox bargain that would be 
fully enforceable under bargain theory,266 "legal doctrines invoked in 
preliminary agreement cases are also used to support unrelated claims of 
precontractual liability. "267 They argue that these types of claims should 
be separated to avoid confusion.268 Consequently, they have focused nar-
rowly on a particular subset of cases in which plaintiffs prevail when they 
rely on preliminary agreements. These cases involve the particular form 
of opportunism and holdup that occurs when parties agree on a simulta-
neous reliance investment and one defects from the agreement in order 
to invest sequentially and enhance private gain. 
265. Schwartz & Scott. supra note 19, at 686. 
266. The preliminary agreements are often incomplete agreements to agree that may be 
fully binding or unenforceable depending on the circumstances. 
267. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 663 (emphasis added). 
268. /d. at 663. 
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Other scholars discussing reliance in the courtship period have focused 
more broadly on whether liability is needed by analyzing whether and 
when a putative promisor is likely to be honest about the probability of a 
trade occurring.269 During the course of negotiations, the incentives for 
honesty may change. Where natural incentives for honest disclosure ex-
ist, then the law may not need to intervene,270 but where a large incentive 
to conceal the actual probabilities of a trade exists, the law may need to 
impose liability to ensure more honest revelations.271 
Each of these scholarly treatments has analyzed why and when reliance 
investments should be protected in order to achieve certain goals and 
offered powerful reasons for protection in a limited set of cases (where an 
agreement regarding promises of simultaneous investment exists) or in a 
broader set of cases (if needed to promote honest disclosure regarding 
the probability of a trade ).272 
In fact, it may be possible to see many reliance claims as related if the 
underlying problem of hold up is analyzed at each stage of the negotia-
tion process. 
This Article does not try to provide a model to rationalize all reliance 
cases in all types of contexts-whether they occur pursuant to an agree-
ment regarding the timing of an investment or whether after a letter of 
intent is negotiated. Instead, it suggests that in evaluating precontractual 
liability claims, the law ought to pay attention to the particular difficulties 
that uncertainty about the future state of the world and the future behav-
ior of one's counterparty poses for promisors who are in the process of 
deciding whether to make an offer. The dual problem is that the invest-
ment reliance needed to reduce such uncertainties will also subject the 
promisee to the risk of holdup and the concomitant possibility for under-
investment. These considerations suggest that in all types of precontrac-
tual cases, unless the promisor can make a credible commitment to not 
act strategically, a legal default rule protecting such reliance and safe-
guarding against holdup is likely to improve welfare.273 When reliance 
cases involve a solicited reliance investment that is linked to a reduction 
in uncertainty for the promisor and the promisor is using the reliance to 
hedge pending the resolution of the uncertainty, there seems to be a large 
disparity in what the promisee is giving up and what the promisor is gain-
ing, and the risk attached to the promisee's investment is linked to factors 
affecting the promisor-matters over which the promisee has little con-
trol-the promisee's claim is and should be likely to succeed. 
A putative promisor who is deciding whether and on what terms to 
commit to an ultimate fully orthodox contract may place great value on 
the ability to delay a commitment to the promisee. There are many rea-
269. See generally Johnston, supra note 15. 
270. !d. at 491. This is most likely to be the case where the promisor is trying to ensure 
that only appropriate counterparties respond to increase the chance of a successful trade. 
271. !d. 
272. fd. 
273. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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sons why a putative promisor might want to delay the point of commit-
ment when he is considering making investments that might be costly to 
undo. There might be value in waiting until more information is available 
that will shed light on future facts affecting the profitability of the deal or 
that will clarify the quality and nature of the promisee with whom the 
putative promisor is negotiating. Uncertainty about these matters "might 
affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure [of the 
promisor] .... ''274 
Financial economists have studied the value of a firm obtaining the 
flexibility that allows it to hedge with an option. The option allows a firm 
to "avoid[] the loss it would have made if it had invested in the first 
period and then seen the price go down. "275 The greater the uncertainty 
about the future, the more valuable it is to have an option to defer.176 In 
fact, the value of the option is lowest when the value of iuture project is 
more certain; then the option worth is close to zero.277 At that point, 
when more information is available, the party with the option then simply 
decides whether to exercise the option given the price. The value of an 
option which allows one to defer investment no longer has much value 
once the future is certain. 
There are different ways that companies can develop or acquire these 
real options to invest. In some cases, the option comes about as a result 
of a contract.278 Companies can also achieve flexibility through adopting 
technologies that will allow them to make switches in the future, depend-
ing on what developments occur in the future. 279 
The key insight280 from capital investment analyses is that companies 
derive great value from the flexibility to postpone investment. Compa-
nies often do not want to commit to begin an irreversible investment until 
after they have acquired new information.281 TI1at insight suggested that 
former analyses of investment decisions based on net present value were 
274. See AviNASH K. DIXIT & RoBERT S. PINDYCK, INYESTMHIT UNDER UNCER· 
TAINTY 6 (1994). This possibility of waiting for additional information is a factor that might 
make a corporation inclined to delay investment by holding onto "an 'option' analogous to 
a financial call option-it has the right but not the obligation to buy an asset at some future 
time of its choosing." ld. 
275. ld. at 10. Those who devised formulas to determine whether investments would be 
beneficial for corporations ignored the very real value of "flexibility to deter, abandon, or 
otherwise alter a project." LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY 
AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 7 (1996). 
276. DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 274, at 13. As Dick Craswell explains, "the option 
value of remaining uncommitted is one of all of the costs and benefits (it's a long list) that 
goes into answering the question of just when it becomes optimal for one party to become 
committed." Email from Richard Craswell, supra note 37; see also Katz, supra note 13, at 
1269. 
277. Conversation with Professor Emeritus Ronald J. Coffey, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law (Feb. 2008). 
278. Trigeorgis gives an example of a contractual option: "Suppose that a large oil com-
pany has a one-year lease to start drilling on undeveloped land with potential oil reserves 
[or up to a year." TRIGEORGIS, supra note 275, at 9-10. 
279. ld. at 13. 
280. DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 274, at 6. 
281. Id. 
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inaccurate because they omitted the value that could be obtained by wait-
ing.~s2 If these insights are applied to the precontractual negotiations 
context where uncertainties are great, they suggest two conclusions. First, 
if there is a great deal of volatility and uncertainty, promisors do not want 
to commit and it may be more valuable to wait. The above should be 
powerfully antagonistic to enforcing the ultimate contract. Second, these 
insights suggest that there is real value to a putative promisor in having 
an option to defer the ultimate contract until more information comes in 
or until uncertainty about the quality of the counterparty is reduced. 
If there is value to the putative promisor in having an option to invest 
until more information comes in, it suggests that the promisor would be 
willing to pay for that valuable right of flexibility. That suggests a liability 
default rule for the privilege of flexibility might be appropriate if there 
are costs associated with explicit options and reason to believe that the 
costs of opting out are low (an explicit disclaimer of Section 90 liability). 
It may explain why courts seem to be willing to compensate promisees 
who invest in a way that affords putative promisors flexibility and permits 
the promisors to hedge pending the resolution of uncertainty. Even if the 
option is not explicitly paid for, the value that companies attach to the 
option to defer suggests that courts may be correct in forcing the putative 
promisors to pay for the option. 
The default rule protecting reliance in precontractual negotiations can 
be connected conceptually to the protection of reliance at other junc-
tures, including the protection of reliance when one party defects from a 
promise to invest simultaneously. The protection of reliance investment 
shares the common element of protecting against strategic behavior. 
At first glance, because the cases involving preliminary agreements 
with explicit agreements on simultaneous investment by the parties are 
expficit agreements, they may not seem apt analogies to use in determin-
ing whether the law should intervene with a liability rule in precontrac-
tual contexts where no explicit agreements of any kind exist. In 
precontractual preliminary negotiations the parties have not reached an 
express preliminary agreement nor have they reached an express agree-
ment on the order of investment by each party. By its terms, Schwartz 
and Scott's suggested approach would permit judicial intervention in the 
form of a liability rule holding one party responsible for the reliance in-
vestment of the other only if there is an express preliminary agreement 
and an express agreement on the order of investment.283 
Schwartz and Scott have provided helpful nonnative guidance for the 
problem of parties acting opportunistically following the establishment of 
an agreement by both parties to invest simultaneously, following which 
282. !d. 
283. Some cases turn on whether specific reference to a future formal agreement would 
preclude recognition of an agreement before the achievement of such a formal contract. 
Those matter~ turn ~n analysis of the parties' intent and contract language, which should 
preclude the mvocatwn of an implied bargain. 
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one party refuses to invest despite an agreement to do so.284 As the au-
thors point out, one party may have "an incentive to defect from any such 
agreement,"285 explaining that "by delaying her decision whether to in-
vest until after the promisee has invested ... [t]he promisor benefits from 
defection if the project turns out to be unprofitable because she will not 
have sunk costs in a losing deal. "286 Parties who defect from an agree-
ment to invest simultaneously when doing so will benefit one of them at 
the expense of the other party, will also fail to maximize the parties' 
surplus. 287 
Although the precise situations are different and involve reliance oc-
curring at different stages of the negotiation process, the cases and factual 
scenarios can be connected by an implied intention to be responsible for 
reliance costs of a party who becomes subject to holdup after investing. 
A liability rule is needed because otherwise the parties will fear that they 
will make themselves worse off by providing the other party with infor-
mation that it can use opportunistically. If the party soliciting investment 
may use the information (from the reliance) for its own benefit without 
paying for it and without promising to pay for it, the investing party will 
be unable to recoup the investment, which will deter investment. That 
same deterrent effect will operate in the agreements to invest simultane-
ously-when the investing party worries about defection by his investing 
partner and therefore fails to invest, the ex post holdup problem occurs. 
Parties will act opportunistically and that may discourage trade unless 
parties can control such hazard at a reasonable cost; moral hazard will 
occur at all different stages of negotiation. If so, it becomes important to 
look beyond the precise factual scenario identified by Schwartz and Scott. 
The danger exists whenever one party "has a greater ability than the 
other to delay a material portion of her work. "2 88 The potential for one 
party to delay investment exists outside of cases where parties explicitly 
agree to invest simultaneously. It also exists when the promisor is solicit-
ing sunk costs from the promisee in order to make determinations about 
whether to proceed and if so, on what terms. Because of the relationship 
between the promisor and the promisee, in which the promisor is gather-
ing information to formulate the terms of the offer and the promisee 
must provide information in the form of investment and sunk costs in 
order to enable the putative promisor to proceed to an offer, the prom-
isor is in effect given the discretion to delay making any investments of its 
own.289 
284. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666. 
285. ld. 
286. ld. 
287. Schwartz and Scott assume that there are some instances where simultaneous in-
vestment would maximize surplus, so a defection from that regime would fail to maximize 
surplus. See id. 
288. ld. at 666 n.ll. 
289. See id. at 666 n.l2. 
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In preliminary negotiations, where one party, the promisor, has the 
ability to delay investment until the promisee invests as a means of clari-
fying whether a deal that is mutually beneficial even exists, the promisee 
i~ continually subject to the risk that if a bargain is ever reached between 
them, it "will reimburse only the promisor's costs."290 Because of a poor 
bargaining position that exists when he has sunk costs and the promisor 
does not have such costs, the promisee can, following the sinking of such 
costs, tell the promisor that he will not proceed but such "threat to exit 
unless his investment costs are reimbursed is not credible."291 
For that reason this Article suggests that because the same danger of 
moral hazard exists whenever a promisor faces uncertainty about the na-
ture of the ultimate transaction and deliberately delays any investment 
until the promisee has invested, a default rule making the promisor re-
sponsible for such solicited verifiable reliance investments would be opti-
mal to avoid the threat of a holdup. This is particularly so where the 
promisor has information about itself that affects the probability of a deal 
being consummated-information that the promisee lacks access to and 
which the promisor may want to conceal-thus impairing the promisee's 
ability to decide on the efficiency of the investment. 
A discussion of the cases examining this proposition follows. 
A. FACTUAL ScENARios REPRESENTING SuccEssFuL CLAIMS 
Chrysler C01p. v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd.292 typifies a class of cases in 
wbich plaintiffs are successful in promissory estoppel claims involving 
pre-contractual negotiations without a preliminary agreement.293 The 
case illustrates a pattern in which the defendant faces uncertainty about 
whether a particular project will succeed. To permit the defendant to pre-
serve tbe benefit of being positioned to proceed should the project sue-
290. Jd. 
291. !d. 
292. 822 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2003). 
293. See also Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998); School-Link Tech., 
lnc. v. Applied Res., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Kan. 2007) (holding that a defendant's 
counterclaim for promissory estoppel survives where plaintiff, a vendor that wished to use 
defendant's kiosks in a project, was unsure that it could produce the kiosks itself and, in 
reliance on plaintiff's promises that defendant would be the sole kiosk supplier, defendant 
produced 1500 kiosks); Roeder v. Pacificorp Fin. Servs., Inc., No. CV-05-1578-ST, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79996 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2006) (holding defendant's counterclaim for 
promissory estoppel survives where counterparty, uncertain whether a new project would 
be ?uccessful, told claimant "to go back and work hard" and promissory estoppel claimant, 
bel!evmg that he would be receiving a long term incentive plan, took on compensation at 
below market value, traveled significantly, and worked long hours); Tour Costa Rica v. 
Country Walkers, Inc., 758 A.2d 795 (Vt. 2000) (affirming a promissory estoppel claim 
where defendant was able to gauge the interest in Costa Rican tours with minimal expense 
?Ince plaintiff did all the work and plaintiff's investment allowed defendant to gauge viabil-
Ity of the area as a tour site). See also older cases in this line, Esquire Radio & Elecs., Inc. 
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986) (allowing recovery on promissory 
estoppel where plaintiff relied on assurances of defendant to import and store product for 
ult1m~t~ repurchase and scheme allowed defendant to deal with uncertainty as to future 
quantJtJes needed); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (1958). 
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ceed, the defendant solicits sunk cost reliance investments by the 
plaintiff. Those sunk costs provide significant benefits to the defendant 
by allowing it to hedge pending the resolution of the uncertainty about 
the project. It gives the defendant the benefit of insuring that it will be 
well positioned to proceed if the project goes ahead. In a sense, the 
plaintiff's sunk cost earns the defendant the ability to proceed, a kind of 
option, but one that the defendant does not pay for expressly. 
In Chrysler v. Chaplake Holdings, the plaintiff had an exclusive right to 
sell high end Lamborghini cars in a broad market that included the Chan-
nel Islands, the U.K., and Ireland.294 Although the plaintiff only sold 
thirty cars annually, that small number still earned it the honor of being 
the "largest Lamborghini dealer in the world,"295 given the total annual 
sales of 250 cars. 
During the 1980s, Chrysler developed an expansion plan that would 
increase production from 250 to 5,000 units per year by doubling the 
number of high end Lamborghinis produced and also bringing on a new, 
lower priced, model that would achieve higher volume sales. The top 
management of Chrysler was involved in the expansion plan and "had 
absolute control" over it.29 6 Chrysler wanted to reach the goal of produc-
ing 5,000 cars per year297 within a five year window. However, there was 
uncertainty at Chrysler about how long the plan would take to achieve 
the goBJ298 and whether the goal was in fact achievable. 299 Chrysler was 
concerned that even if it ratcheted Ltp the production of low and high end 
Lamborghinis, the dealer network might not be able to handle an in-
creased number. To alleviate the uncertainty about whether the plan 
would fail if the dealership capacity for selling a larger number of cars 
faltered, Chrysler assured the plaintiff that it would maintain its exclusive 
dealership only if it took steps to demonstrate an increased ability to han-
dle a largel: volume of cars.300 
After a Chrysler representative reiterated its assurance that the plain-
tiff's exclusive rights would depend on its ability to expand the capacity of 
its dealership to handle larger volume, the plaintiff developed a plan with 
its Credit Suisse bankers. The plaintiff's plan included a series of steps to 
facilitate the handling of a larger volume of cars including adding staff, 
increasing showroom size in various locations, and making other capital 
improvements. Credit Suisse also authorized an increase in its overdraft 
facility to fund the plaintiff's plan.301 In early 1990, after the plaintiff had 
built a new distribution center, acquired new facilities, secured financing, 
294. 822 A.2d. at 1027. 
295. !d. at 1028. 
296. !d. 
297. !d. 
298. !d. at 1029 (detailing Iacocca's extension of the time frame for expansion from five 
to six years). 
299. One Chrysler representative testified that '"if and when we get to 3,000 a year' 
then Chrysler might consider expanding its existing dealer network." !d. at 1028 n.4. 
300. !d. at 1028. 
301. !d. at 1029. 
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and added staff, a representative of Chrysler endorsed the plan.302 
During this time period certain factors, including an economic down-
turn, cast doubt on the wisdom of Chrysler's proceeding with its expan-
sion plan, particularly the lower cost Lamborghini.303 Chrysler started to 
explore "an exit strategy"304 due to increased doubts about its own plan's 
feasibility but continued to offer assurances to the plaintiff that "produc-
tion for both the Diablo [high end] and the P140 [low end] was on 
schedule. "305 
Despite the assurances, Chrysler delayed production, and ultimately 
the delays in production "eroded ... profitability" for the plaintiff.306 
These delays deprived the plaintiff of an income stream that could help 
service its debt obligations and the bank called the plaintiff's loan307 that 
had been taken out to fund the expansion. 
A jury found for the plaintiff on its promissory estoppel claim. TI1is 
judgment was affirmed on appeaJ.3°8 This result makes sense because it 
involved a number of factors that make success more likely and defensi-
ble as a normative matter. The case involved significant uncertainty 
about the future, which the defendant was trying to hedge by soliciting 
significant sunk costs from the plaintiff. Those sunk costs provided signif-
icant benefit to the defendant by helping to position the defendant to 
take advantage of a future lucrative opportunity once the uncertainty was 
resolved. By soliciting the sunk costs, the defendant gained an option to 
proceed but without paying for that privilege. The sunk cost investments 
by the plaintiff were also useful in helping to distinguish the plaintiff as an 
able player in the future opportunity. TI1e plaintiff's sunk cost subjected 
it to the possibility of a hold up. Once the investments were sunk, the 
plaintiff would lose the investment altogether if no deal materialized. But 
more importantly, the sequential investment subjected the plaintiff to the 
risk that should a deal materialize, the plaintiff would be subject to the 
defendant's ability to capture part of the investment in the bargained-for 
surplus. TI1is case is representative of other similar cases, which are often 
successful claims for plaintiffs and have been overlooked in the scholarly 
literature. 
Taylor Box Co. v. SAR Group Ltd. 309 is another example of a plaintiff 
prevailing on a promissory estoppel claim in the context of negotiations 
without a preliminary agreement or contract. TI1e defendant faced uncer-
tainties as to whether or not a particular box design would be desired by 
the client, and whether a better box could be produced quickly enough to 
302. /d. 
303. /d. at 1030. 
304. !d. at 1030 n.6. 
305. !d. at 1030. 
306. !d. 
307. /d. 
308. !d. at 1038 . 
... 309. Taylor Box Co. v. SAR Group Ltd., No. 2002-1033, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 7, at 
·•·18-19 (Super. Ct. R.I. Mar. 25, 2005). 
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meet a deadline. The defendant solicited sunk costs from the plaintiff by 
authorizing the plaintiff to start the manufacturing process for a custom 
box. The court viewed promissory estoppel as an alternative to a breach 
of contract claim.31D 
The plaintiff, Taylor Box, was a custom box manufacturing company. 
The defendant, Audette, approached Taylor Box and its president, Daniel 
J. Shedd, about making a "better value" DVD box for its customer.3ll 
The parties met in April of 2001, and the defendant made it clear in this 
meeting that the project was urgent. Audette specified that he "needed 
the product by mid-June."312 
Over the next week, Taylor Box made a prototype box, looked into 
pricing,313 and provided quotes. Audette, by his actions, conveyed to 
Taylor Box that a deal was imminent.314 The defendant ordered 2,000 
boxes, referenced a time period when it expected the plaintiff to deliver, 
and agreed to a one-time setup charge in order to develop the specialty 
dies that Taylor Box needed to produce the boxes. The plaintiff immedi-
ately ordered the material needed to produce the boxes and apprised the 
defendant of the order for the materiaP15 Shedd, a representative of the 
plaintiff, testified that Audette told him that the defendant's client had 
"approved the design."316 Audette admitted in court, however, that he 
never secured the contract with his customer and that he did not reveal 
that fact to the plaintif£.317 
After the mid-June delivery date had passed, Audette continued to 
make comments that l_ed Taylor Box to believe that the project was still 
going forward. In July, however, Audette indicated to the plaintiff that 
"the project was going forward but it was a budget issue with his cli-
ent. "318 The plaintiff did not hear anything more from Audette, and in 
October, sent over a $10,000 cancellation charge.3 l 9 Audette indicated 
that he would refuse to pay the cancellation charge and, indeed, it was 
never paid.320 
Audette contended that because he understood that he would need to 
put down a fifty percent deposit to have a contract with Taylor Box, and 
he had not done so, there was no contract.32 l Audette also claimed that it 
was his understanding nothing could happen with the contract until his 
client approved a preproduction sample, in addition to the prototype that 
310. ld. at *9. 
311. ld. at *2. 
312. !d. at *1-2. 
313. ld. at *2-3. 
314. ld. at *3 (delivery within 4-6 weeks contemplated). 
315. !d. at *4. 
316. ld. at *3-4. 
317. ld. at *6. 
318. ld. at *8. 
319. ld. at *9. 
320. !d. at *7-10. 
321. ld. at *9. 
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had already been approved.322 The Rhode Island Superior Court did not 
believe Audette's view of the facts because it would have been unreason-
able to require Taylor Box to set up an entire manufacturing line before 
having a contract.323 
Taylor Box sued Audette for breach of contract, seeking $28,000.324 
TI1e court noted that the plaintiff brought an alternative claim of detri-
mental reliance.325 "Although not so stated, this [was] essentially a claim 
based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. "326 
In a non-jury trial, the judge found for the plaintiff Taylor Box on the 
basis of promissory estoppel and ordered judgment in the amount of 
$10,960.35.327 The plaintiff had a clear and unambiguous promise of an 
eventually perfected contract and the repeated promises that the deal 
would go forward.328 
There were many uncertainties that affected the negotiations in this 
case. T11e defendant lacked experience with the production of specialty 
boxes329 and was uncertain as to whether Taylor Box could produce a box 
that was satisfactory to its customer. Apparently Audette was uncertain 
that its customer would even want a new box, matters over which the 
plaintiff would have little control and little advance knowledge. While 
these uncertainties were being resolved, the defendant solicited sunk 
costs from Taylor Box in starting the project. In reliance upon the defen-
dant's willingness to pay set up costs and ongoing assurances, the plaintiff 
moved forward with production.330 The defendant stood to benefit be-
cause he had a dedicated company-Taylor Box-working on the boxes 
under an expedited time frame. 
The plaintiff's sunk costs subjected it to holdup possibility because it 
would lose the investment altogether if no deal materialized and would 
have to share the surplus with the defendant if a deal were consum-
mated-and a deal would not materialize unless the plaintiff began the 
work. T11e urgent tone of the meeting clearly caused Taylor Box to be-
lieve that it needed to start the project quickly or risk losing the possible 
contract. As a result of ongoing assurances, Taylor Box "kept the project 
'alive' for about six months."331 It was not possible to return the materi-
als after such time, because many of the items were transaction spe-
cific.332 Thus, the court's finding, imposing liability for the plaintiffs, was 
an appropriate result. It mitigated the problems of holdup and reduced 
trade that would otherwise occur if there were no contractually negoti-
322. !d. at *6. 
323. !d. at *6 n.l. 
324. !d. at *9. 
325. !d. at *9-10. 
326. ld. at *10. 
327. ld. at *19. 
328. !d. at *18-19. 
329. !d. at *4-5. 
330. !d. at *7. 
331. !d. at *18. 
332. !d. at *18. 
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ated protection, no evidence of a small community with actions transpar-
ent enough to serve as the basis for reputational or other non-judicial 
sanctions, and no evidence that "there are private strategies and natural 
incentives (i.e., all the mechanisms of implicit--that is, not judicially en-
forceable-contracting) that might adjust matters between those who are 
economically bestowing benefits on one another. For example, the op-
tions may be reciproca1."333 In such cases if the parties have not each 
taken pre-commitment actions that might form the basis for a kind of 
implicit contract that rests on the assumption that "'I'm gaining as much 
as I'm giving,"'334 there might be reason for judicial intervention. 
B. CAsEs FROM OTHER DocTRINAL AREAS 
THAT PROTECT RELIANCE 
An example of a case in which a court protects pre-contractual reliance 
investments that are solicited by the putative offeror but under a different 
(non-promissory estoppel rubric) is Earhart v. William Low Co. 335 
Though decided on a theory of quantwn meruit, the case ended by pro-
tecting the investments made by the plaintiff on the basis of assurances by 
the defendant and thus is similar to cases decided under promissory es-
toppel. The investments were solicited by the defendant during a period 
of uncertainty.336 The defendant did not know about certain matters, in-
cluding whether a second tract of land could be acquired in addition to 
the initial tract and whether financing would be obtainable.337 Neverthe-
less, the reliance investment solicited by the defendant during this period 
of uncertainty was valuable and allowed the defendant to avoid forfeiting 
the permit to build, which might have occurred unless the plaintiff took 
certain steps, including making an investment on the second tract. 338 
In that case, a contractor began work on the construction of a trailer 
park at the request of the defendant.339 The defendant owned one tract 
of land and was negotiating for the acquisition of a second tract owned by 
a third party.340 The defendant negotiated a contract of construction with 
the plaintiff that would employ the plaintiff to construct the park on both 
tracts of land.341 The contract would not become binding until the defen-
dant secured financing for the project, and the second tract would not 
belong to the defendant without that financing.342 
333. Ronald J. Coffey, Email from Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Law 
School to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Law School (May 7, 2008, 
15:04 CST) (on file with author). 
334. ld. 
335. Earhart v. William Low Co., 600 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1979). 
336. ld. at 1345. 
337. ld. at 1346. 
338. ld. 
339. ld. at 1345. 
340. ld. 
341. ld. at 1346. 
342. ld. 
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During the period when the defendant was unsure whether it would 
secure the financing on the second tract, the defendant learned from the 
plaintiff that the ability to build a trailer park on the second tract owned 
by the third party might expire unless construction on the trailer park 
began.343 The defendant then requested that the plaintiff begin work on 
the mobile home park.344 The defendant did not know at that juncture 
whether it would acquire the second tract of land, or whether it would get 
the financing, but one can see why the defendant may have wanted the 
plaintiff to invest money in construction. The plaintiff's investment 
helped to preserve the right to build the mobile home park, and that may 
in turn have been important in helping to secure the financing by making 
the project viable. 
After the plaintiff had commenced work, the defendant refused to pay 
the plaintiff for the work done, citing the hiring of another contractor as 
an excuse.345 When the plaintiff sued in quantum meruit, it faced a partic-
ularly difficult problem: the work on the second tract, since it did not 
belong to the defendant but to a third party, did not directly benefit the 
defendant and so might not be recoverable under a quantum meruit the-
ory.346 Normally quantum meruit would require that which is to be dis-
gorged as an unjust enrichment benefit the defendant, who could argue 
that the benefit was to a third party, not to the defendant.347 
The court nevertheless found a benefit to the defendant, basing its de-
cision on an "extraordinarily broad concept of benefit"348 developed in 
the case law that looked to the theory "that performance at another's 
request may itself constitute a benefit."349 In reaching that conclusion 
and rejecting the narrow concept of "direct benefit" that the trial court 
had applied, the court looked to a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice 
Traynor of the California Supreme Court, in which he argued that direct 
benefit should not be the governing issue.35° Chief Justice Traynor advo-
cated a rule granting a plaintiff quantum meruit recovery as one that ap-
propriately "places the loss where it belongs-on the party whose 
requests induced performance in justifiable reliance on the belief that the 
requested performance would be paid for. "351 
Although Professor Farnsworth may be correct that the notion of bene-
fit applied in Earhart is "artificial,"352 the case may be more important if 
one thinks of Earhart as part of a larger group of cases in which courts 
protect a party who relies in a way that benefits the other party, even if 
343. !d. 
344. !d. 
345. !d. at 1344. 
346. !d. at 1347. 
347. !d. 
348. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 224. 
349. Earhart, 600 P.2d at 1348. 
350. !d. at 1350. 
729351. ld. at 1350-51 (citing Coleman Eng'g Co. v. N. Am. Aviation, Inc .. 420 P.2d 713. (1966)~ . 
352. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 224. 
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no direct tangible benefit exists, because of the problem that solicited 
investments pose in terms of opportunistic behavior and hold up. Unless 
those investments, which are solicited during a period of uncertainty for 
the defendant, and which may help the defendant hedge or reduce uncer-
tainty, are compensated, future parties may decline to invest and putative 
offerors will be deprived of needed information. 
Maybe Earhart was a stretch doctrinally when it expanded quantum 
meruit to include a case in which the only direct benefit was to a third 
party. However, the case makes sense in the context of the danger of 
hold up and the incentive problem created when investments are solicited 
by a party as a way of helping the non-investing party hedge and then not 
compensated or reimbursed by a liability rule. Without a liability rule to 
cover cases like Earhart, future parties may be unwilling to invest and the 
risk of uncontrolled opportunism will act as a drag on future trades. Sim-
ilar arguments can be made to support promissory estoppel liability in 
pre-contractual negotiation cases, even those that do not involve a tradi-
tional "agreement." 
C. WHAT THE ScHWARTZ AND Scorr PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT 
CAsEs TEACH Us AsouT THE HoLD UP PROBLEM lN 
PRECONTRACTUAL HoFFMAN TYPE CAsEs 
As noted above, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have suggested that 
reliance investments that occur following a preliminary agreement where 
the parties, as part of their preliminary agreement, promise to invest si-
multaneously and one party subsequently defers that investment in a way 
that disadvantages the other party, should be compensable.353 The delay 
is often considered by courts to be a breach of the duty of good faith that 
applies to preliminary agreements, and the promisee should be able to-
and is under the case law-able to recover its reliance expenses.354 
It may be useful to examine the cases considered by Schwartz and Scott 
illustrating protection for investment reliance following a binding prelimi-
nary agreement in order to see if there is a common justificative frame-
work that can explain or justify when the law should intervene to protect 
reliance investments, particularly where the danger of sequential invest-
ment is present. In both reliance following a preliminary agreement and 
reliance in preliminary negotiation, uncertainty hampers the ability to 
reach a fully contingent contract that would protect all reliance invest-
ments and transaction costs prevent bargaining over reliance investments 
since they remain non-contractible.355 
To illustrate how the obligation of good faith operates to protect reli-
ance in the period following a preliminary agreement Schwartz and Scott 
chose to analyze Kandel v. Center for Urological Treatment and Re-
353. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 662. 
354. !d. 
355. !d. at 665. 
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search.3S6 In that case the plaintiff, a doctor, joined the defendant's urol-
ogy practice.357 The plaintiff's employment contract with the practice 
obligated both parties to negotiate in good faith at the end of one year 
toward an agreement that would permit the plaintiff to buy a one-third 
share in the practice through an acquisition of shares in the corporation 
owning the practice.358 
After the year expired, the parties negotiated but could not reach an 
agreement on terms.359 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had not 
bargained in good faith because of the amount that the corporation 
would require the plaintiff to pay to the corporation on termination of his 
employment.360 The legal question for the court was whether the defen-
dant had breached its good faith obligation when it negotiated but failed 
to reach terms.361 
In deciding whether the court's decision to deny relief to the doctor 
was appropriate, Schwartz and Scott considered whether either of the 
parties breached an obligation to invest simultaneously in the success of 
the enterprise and whether, even if both parties complied with their obli-
gation to invest simultaneously, either could be found to have violated of 
the obligation of good faith that would govern a binding preliminary 
agreement.362 The court had to consider what the scope of good faith 
entailed when the parties were negotiating the terms of a buy-in of the 
new partner to the corporation. To determine the scope of the obligation 
of good faith and whether it was breached, Schwartz and Scott rightly 
focused on the difficulties of contracting and the risks that each party 
faced ex ante when the corporation hired the doctor. 363 Those difficulties 
in tum explained why it was not possible or optimal for the parties to 
reach a fully contingent contract that fixed the terms of an ultimate buy-
in for the new physician immediately upon the hiring of a new doctor. 
Each side needed to invest further in order to resolve uncertainties and 
contribute toward the success of the new partner's contribution. Uncer-
tainty ex ante would make it unclear whether the new partner would in 
fact be worthwhile enough to bring in as a full fledged partner. Asym-
metric information problems meant that the corporation lacked informa-
tion about how valuable the prospective partner was, and the prospective 
partner did not know how valuable a practice he was potentially join-
ing.364 To deal with these uncertainties, the parties put off the negotia-
tion of the ultimate agreement until the end of the first year but 
356. Jd. at 694. 
357. Kandel v. Ctr. for Urological Treatment and Research, P.C., No. M2000-02128-
COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 598567, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2002). 
358. This obligation to bargain in good faith was explicit. Id. at *1. 
359. Jd. at *1. 
360. ld. at *2. 
361. Jd. at *4. 
362. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 695. 
363. Id. 
364. Jd. 
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committed to invest right away.365 The advantage of postponing the final 
agreement was that some of the uncertainties and asymmetries would 
have been resolved; the corporation would know how much value the 
partner could bring to the practice and the partner would have better 
information about the value of joining this practice (as distinct from other 
practices). 
Given those difficulties, postponement of a final agreement served 
many purposes. The corporation could postpone a decision about the fi-
nal terms until the final worth of the prospective member of the corpora-
tion had been revealed over time. Because each party met its obligation 
to invest simultaneously in the practice, Schwartz and Scott agree with 
the court that there was no breach of the good faith obligation.366 
The legal issue in Kandel was whether the corporation breached its ob-
ligation of good faith when it offered certain terms that the doctor/pro-
spective member of the corporation found objectionable.367 Because the 
value that the plaintiff would bring to the practice was uncertain ex ante, 
the defendant would have been unwilling to set the terms of the ultimate 
contract of buy-in terms for the plaintiff ex ante. However, the defendant 
and the plaintiff were both willing to invest simultaneously in the interim 
and to obligate themselves to attempt to work out final terms after some 
of that uncertainty was resolved in the first year of practice.368 The court 
found no breach. Schwartz and Scott explained that such an outcome is 
justifiable because each party was committed to furnish certain invest-
ments simultaneously and each party performed its obligation to invest in 
the practice.369 The corporation invested in training the doctor/plaintiff, 
who in turn made an investment of human capita!.370 Since neither party 
failed to invest, neither party was subject to holdup, as would have been 
the case, Schwartz and Scott argued, if the practice had failed to invest in 
training even after the doctor has undertaken the sunk cost of moving.371 
Since each party met its obligations to invest simultaneously, the doctor 
could not successfully argue that the corporation had breached its duty of 
good faith. 372 The corporation had an obligation not to withhold an in-
vestment in such a way that would subject the other party to holdup, but 
if the corporation invested in training, it was not obligated to reach an 
agreement with the doctor. Extending good faith to obligate the corpora-
tion to reach an agreement with the doctor would shield the doctor from 
a risk that he undertook ex ante. It was possible that after each party 
invested, the preliminary agreement would not be finalized because it no 
longer seemed profitable, but the parties should not be insulated from 
365. Kandel, 2002 WL 598567, at *1. 
366. Schwarcz & Scott, supra note 19, at 696. 
367. Kandel, 2002 WL 598567, at *7 (describing the offered terms). 
368. !d. at *1. 
369. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 695. 
370. !d. 
371. !d. at 696. 
372. !d. at 695. 
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such risk, and so the good faith obligation should not be interpreted to 
mandate agreement on terms.373 
The authors thus suggested that where there is a promise to invest si-
multaneously and one party delays investment, a cause of action should 
lie because of the possibility that one party will be subject to hold up by 
the other party.374 To prevent that outcome and to encourage invest-
ment, liability should obtain when there is delayed investment that sub-
jects the other party to holdup. Where the parties invested 
simultaneously but failed to reach agreement on the ultimate terms,375 as 
in Kandel, no cause of action should lie because liability is not necessary 
to induce efficient investment. What is needed to induce efficient invest-
ment is legal protection against a particular form of holdup-that of a 
delay in investment by one when each agreed to invest simultaneously. If 
the plaintiff is protected against that, there is no need to protect him 
against the risk that the parties will fail to reach a final contract. One of 
the risks that the plaintiff assumed was that tis work in the practice over 
a year's duration would demonstrate that even with training from his em-
ployer, he did not appear to be a desirable partner. 
In the cases at the center of this Article, no preliminary agreement on 
the type or order of investment that each party will make existed, in part 
because it was too early to even agree on a preliminary agreement. Thus, 
if one applies the insight of Schwartz and Scott literally, it would suggest 
that there should not be liability for reliance investments made during the 
pre-contractual period where there is no preliminary agreement and no 
agreement on a sequence of investments.376 The particular rule sug-
gested by Schwartz and Scott and examined in cases like Kandel, permit-
ting a promisee to recover sunk costs "if his promisor deviated from an 
agreed investment sequence"377 would not technically apply to a prelimi-
nary negotiation which lacks a preliminary agreement or an agreement to 
invest. Nevertheless, there is a similar danger of holdup when one party 
is solicited to invest in ways that benefit the other party, often by reduc-
ing uncertainty about whether a transaction would be profitable. For that 
reason the law should look to the underlying logic of the Schwartz and 
Scott analysis that protects an investing promisee against a situation 
"when [ d]efection from a preliminary agreement to invest simultaneously 
thus disadvantages the promisee."37S The logic suggests that the law 
should compensate parties for reliance investments made in precontrac-
tual negotiations when doing so would protect the investing party from 
373. Id. at 696. 
374. ld. at 686-87. 
375. This would likely be the case where the investment demonstrated that the doctor's 
~ort~ _was not as high as expected. Id. at 696. This would demonstrate "that trade was 
meffJCJent ex post." ld. at 696 n.97. 
376. Th_at outcome would be consistent with many cases that hold there is no obligation 
of good fa1th that applies in the preliminary negotiation phase to protect reliance. There 
are some notable exceptions to this principle. 
377. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 667. 
378. ld. at 666. 
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the holdup risk that occurs should one party invest first. In the precon-
tractual early negotiation cases there is no expectation that there will be 
simultaneous investment. Instead, the party deciding whether to formu-
late an offer (the promisor) is delaying investment until it can determine 
if a full-fledged offer should be made. Because there is no agreement or 
promise to invest simultaneously, the delay in investment by the putative 
offeror is not a breach of any explicit promise nor does it specifically fall 
within the scope of cases subject to Schwartz and Scott's admonition that 
delays of agreements to invest simultaneously following a preliminary 
agreement should entitle the other party to recover. Nevertheless, the 
prior investment by the promisee should be protected to achieve the goal 
of efficient investment and prevent hold up; otherwise, there will be un-
derinvestment and fewer trades, especially if the promisee's lack of 
knowledge about the promisor's project makes pricing a bargain over the 
investment costly. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the precontractual negotiation period for 
two purposes: (1) to examine whether a liability rule making one party 
responsible for the reliance costs of the investing party is justified; and (2) 
to ascertain whether the case law outcomes are consistent with such a 
rule. To determine whether a liability rule is justified, the Article has 
examined how the problem of incomplete contracting, uncertainty, and 
sequential investment all contribute to the conclusion that without a lia-
bility rule, reliance would be suboptimal. Uncertainty about the future 
makes it hard to reach a complete contract, without which one party may 
be reluctant to invest, since the investment will be lost if the deal does not 
materialize, the contract itself will not offer complete protection because 
the investment may be non-contractible, and the investment by one party 
because of the sequential nature of the investment can subject the invest-
ing party to holdup by the other party. If a contract ultimately is formed, 
the non-investing party may capture part of the surplus, leaving an inade-
quate incentive in the other party to invest. 
Traditionally, the law nonetheless denied all recovery to an investing 
party if there was no contract. Following the adoption of Section 90, 
courts took a more liberal view and found liability even absent a full-
fledged bargain. Hoffman v. Red Owl represented the ''high-water 
mark" for such liability.379 
Recently, two scholars, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, have argued 
that the case law demonstrates that courts deny recovery in preliminary 
negotiations unless there is an agreement, but do impose liability and 
grant reliance recoveries when the parties achieve a preliminary agree-
ment which includes an agreement to invest simultaneously, and one 
379. See generally Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); IAN 
AYRES & RrCHARD SrElDEL, STUmEs rN CoNTRACT 462 (2008). 
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party subsequently delays investing for strategic reasons.3so 
TI1ese two authors have drawn a strong line between precontractual 
negotiation where claims fail and reliance following preliminary agree-
ments where claims succeed. This Article has challenged the conclusion 
that precontractual negotiation claims fail absent a showing that an 
agreement exists. In so doing the Article rationalizes both sets of cases 
into a unifying justificative theory in which the law protects reliance in 
both sets of factual scenarios at different stages of the negotiation if the 
Jaw can mitigate the effects of opportunistic hold up through a liability 
rule. 
380. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19. 
